The signaling role of policy actions

Journal of Monetary Economics

Volumn 57, Issue 6, 2010, Pages 682-695

  Baeriswyl, Romain ^a   Cornand, Camille ^b  

^a SWISS NATIONAL BANK   (Switzerland)

^b UNIVERSITÉ DE STRASBOURG   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77956190998     PISSN: 03043932     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2010.06.001     Document Type: Article

References (17)

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