Optimal monetary policy with imperfect common knowledge

Journal of Monetary Economics

Volumn 54, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 267-301

  Adam, Klaus ^a,b  

^a EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK   (Germany)

^b CEPR   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Information imperfections; Nominal demand management; Private information; Rational inattention; Shannon capacity

Indexed keywords

EID: 33847645917     PISSN: 03043932     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2005.08.020     Document Type: Article

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