Infant industry protection revisited

International Economic Journal

Volumn 16, Issue 3, 2002, Pages 115-133

  Bhattacharjea, Aditya ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF DELHI   (India)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77956135115     PISSN: 10168737     EISSN: 1743517X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/10168730200000024     Document Type: Article

References (25)

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