Assessing semantic coherence and logical fallacies in joint probability estimates

Behavior Research Methods

Volumn 42, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 373-380

  Wolfe, Christopher R ^a   Reyna, Valerie F ^b  

^a MIAMI UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b Cornell University ^*  (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; COMPUTER PROGRAM; LOGIC; METHODOLOGY; PROBABILITY; PSYCHOLOGY; SEMANTICS; STATISTICAL ANALYSIS; STATISTICS;

DATA INTERPRETATION, STATISTICAL; LOGIC; PROBABILITY; PSYCHOLOGY, EXPERIMENTAL; RESEARCH DESIGN; SEMANTICS; SOFTWARE;

EID: 77955910376     PISSN: 1554351X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3758/BRM.42.2.373     Document Type: Article

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