Merger simulation in competition policy: A survey

Journal of Competition Law and Economics

Volumn 6, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 277-319

  Budzinski Oliver, O ^a,b   Ruhmer, Isabel ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN DENMARK   (Denmark)

^b UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL MARBURG   (Germany)

^c UNIVERSITY OF MANNHEIM   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77955739646     PISSN: 17446414     EISSN: 17446422     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/joclec/nhp014     Document Type: Article

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