Monoculture versus diversity in competition economics

Cambridge Journal of Economics

Volumn 32, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 295-324

  Budzinski, Oliver ^a  

^a PHILIPPS UNIVERSITY MARBURG   (Germany)

Author keywords

Antitrust; Competition policy paradigms; Industrial economics; Methodology of science; More economic approach

Indexed keywords

ASSESSMENT METHOD; COMPETITION POLICY; ECONOMIC ANALYSIS; EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS; THEORETICAL STUDY; WELFARE IMPACT;

EID: 40749087137     PISSN: 0309166X     EISSN: 14643545     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/cje/bem031     Document Type: Article

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