Competition policy with optimally differentiated rules instead of "per se rules vs rule of reason"

Journal of Competition Law and Economics

Volumn 2, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 215-244

  Christiansen, Arndt ^b   Kerber, Wolfgang ^a  

^a PHILIPPS UNIVERSITY MARBURG   (Germany)

^b NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33745953976     PISSN: 17446414     EISSN: 17446422     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/joclec/nhl009     Document Type: Article

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