Making European merger policy more predictable

Making European Merger Policy More Predictable

Volumn , Issue , 2005, Pages 1-194

  Voigt, Stefan ^a   Schmidt, André ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF KASSEL   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF GÖTTINGEN   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84891458564     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1007/1-4020-3090-8     Document Type: Book

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