Outside monitoring and CEO compensation in the banking industry

Journal of Corporate Finance

Volumn 16, Issue 4, 2010, Pages 383-399

  John, Kose ^a   Mehran, Hamid ^b   Qian, Yiming ^c  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF IOWA   (United States)

Author keywords

Agency problems; CEO compensation; Corporate governance; Pay for performance sensitivity; Regulation; Risk shifting; Subordinated debt

Indexed keywords

EID: 77955175982     PISSN: 09291199     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2010.01.001     Document Type: Article

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