Strategy and mechanism lessons from the first ad auctions trading agent competition

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 287-296

  Jordan, Patrick R ^a   Wellman, Michael P ^b   Balakrishnan, Guha ^b  

^a YAHOO RESEARCH   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

Author keywords

ad auctions; empirical mechanism design

Indexed keywords

AUCTION MECHANISMS; MECHANISM DESIGN; STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR; TRADING AGENT COMPETITION;

COMPETITION; ELECTRONIC COMMERCE;

MACHINE DESIGN;

EID: 77954781620     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1807342.1807389     Document Type: Conference Paper

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