Gross versus net equalization scheme in a federation with decentralized leadership

Journal of Urban Economics

Volumn 68, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 205-214

  Breuillé, Marie Laure ^a,b   Madiès, Thierry ^c   Taugourdeau, Emmanuelle ^d  

^a Centre d'Economie et Sociologie Appliquees a l'Agriculture et aux Espaces Ruraux   (France)

^b School of Oriental and African Studies   (France)

^c UNIVERSITY OF FRIBOURG   (Switzerland)

^d Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique   (France)

Author keywords

Current and capital public expenditures; Decentralized leadership; Fiscal federalism; Gross and net equalization schemes

Indexed keywords

EID: 77954385917     PISSN: 00941190     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jue.2010.04.002     Document Type: Article

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