Samaritan versus rotten kid: Another look

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 64, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 91-110

  Dijkstra, Bouwe R ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Altruism; Rotten kid theorem; Samaritan's dilemma

Indexed keywords

EID: 34447502524     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2006.06.006     Document Type: Article

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