Tax competition in a fiscal union with decentralized leadership

Journal of Urban Economics

Volumn 55, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 498-513

  Köthenbürger, Marko ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MUNICH   (Germany)

Author keywords

Capital tax competition; Commitment; Federalism; State leadership

Indexed keywords

EID: 2342474568     PISSN: 00941190     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jue.2003.11.002     Document Type: Article

References (37)

1. D. Begg, J. Crémer, J.P. Danthine, J. Edwards, V. Grilli, D. Neven, P. Seabright, H.W. Sinn, A. Venables, Ch. Wyplosz, Making Sense of Subsidiarity: How Much Centralization for Europe? Monitoring European Integration 4. A CEPR Annual Report, London, 1993.
2. K. Bjorvatn, G. Schjelderup, Tax competition and international public goods, International Tax and Public Finance 9 (2002) 111-120.
3. R. Boadway, F.R. Flatters, Efficiency and equalization payments in a federal system of government: a synthesis and extension of recent results, Canadian Journal of Economics 15 (1982) 613-633.
4. R. Boadway, M. Keen, Efficiency and the optimal direction of federal-state transfers, International Tax and Public Finance 3 (1996) 137-155.
5. R. Boadway, M. Marchand, M. Vigneault, The consequences of overlapping tax bases for redistribution and public spending in a federation, Journal of Public Economics 68 (1998) 453-478.
6. S. Bucovetsky, M. Smart, The efficiency consequences of local revenue equalization: tax competition and tax distortions, CESifo working paper No. 767, Munich, 2002.
7. S. Bucovetsky, J.D. Wilson, Tax competition with two tax instruments, Regional Science and Urban Economics 21 (1991) 333-350.
8. J.K. Brueckner, Strategic interaction among governments: an overview of empirical studies, International Regional Science Review 26 (2003) 175-188.
9. A.J. Caplan, R.C. Cornes, E.C.D. Silva, Pure public goods and income redistribution in a federation with decentralized leadership and imperfect labor mobility, Journal of Public Economics 77 (2000) 265-284.
10. A.J. Caplan, E.C.D. Silva, Federal acid rain games, Journal of Urban Economics 46 (1999) 25-52.
11. R.S. Chirinko, St.M. Fazzari, A.P. Meyer, How responsive is business capital formation to its user cost? An exploration with micro data, Journal of Public Economics 74 (1999) 53-80.
12. H. Crémer, F. Gahvari, Tax evasion, fiscal competition, and economic integration, European Economic Review 44 (2000) 1633-1657.
13. B. Dahlby, Fiscal externalities and the design of intergovernmental grants, International Tax and Public Finance 3 (1996) 397-412.
14. J.A. DePater, G.M. Myers, Strategic capital tax competition: a pecuniary externality and a corrective device, Journal of Urban Economics 36 (1994) 66-78.
15. M. Hayashi, R. Boadway, An empirical analysis of intergovernmental tax interaction: the case of business income taxes in Canada, Canadian Journal of Economics 34 (2001) 481-503.
16. J.F. Helliwell, R. McKitrick, Comparing capital mobility across provincial and national borders, Canadian Journal of Economics 23 (1999) 1164-1173.
17. W.H. Hoyt, Tax policy coordination, vertical fiscal externalities, and optimal taxation in a system of hierarchical governments, Journal of Urban Economics 50 (2001) 491-516.
18. E. Janeba, Tax competition when governments lack commitment: Excess capacity as a countervailing threat, American Economic Review 90 (2000) 1508-1519.
19. M. Keen, Vertical tax externalities in the theory of fiscal federalism, IMF Staff Papers 45 (1998) 454-485.
20. P. Kehoe, Policy cooperation among benevolent governments may be undesirable, Review of Economic Studies 56 (1989) 289-296.
21. M. Köthenbürger, Tax competition and fiscal equalization, International Tax and Public Finance 9 (2002) 391-408.
22. M. Köthenbürger, Tax competition in a fiscal union with decentralized leadership, CESifo working paper No. 943, Munich, 2003.
23. K. Messere (Ed.), The Tax System in Industrialized Countries, Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford, 1998.
24. K. Mitsui, M. Sato, Ex ante free mobility, ex post immobility, and time consistency in a federal system, Journal of Public Economics 82 (2001) 445-460.
25. G.M. Myers, Optimality, free mobility, and the regional authority in a federation, Journal of Public Economics 43 (1990) 107-121.
26. W.E. Oates, Federalism and government finance, in: J.M. Quigley, E. Smolensky (Eds.), Modern Public Finance, Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, 1994, pp. 126-151.
27. C. Perroni, K. Scharf, Tiebout with politics: capital tax competition and constitutional choices, Review of Economic Studies 68 (2001) 133-154.
28. T. Persson, G. Tabellini, The politics of 1992: Fiscal policy and European integration, Review of Economic Studies 59 (1992) 689-701.
29. J.M. Poterba, Capital budgets, borrowing rules, and state capital spending, Journal of Public Economics 56 (1995) 165-187.
30. Y. Qian, G. Roland, Federalism and the soft budget constraint, American Economic Review 88 (1998) 1143-1162.
31. J.A. Rodden, Soft budget constraints and German federalism, in: J.A. Rodden, G. Eskeland (Eds.), Decentralization and the Challenge of Hard Budget Constraints, MIT Press, Cambridge, in press.
32. J.A. Rodden, G. Eskeland (Eds.), Decentralization and the Challenge of Hard Budget Constraints, MIT Press, Cambridge, in press.
33. E.C.D. Silva, A.J. Caplan, Transboundary pollution control in federal systems, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 34 (1997) 173-186.
34. M. Smart, Taxation and deadweight loss in a system of intergovernmental transfers, Canadian Journal of Economics 31 (1998) 189-206.
35. D.E. Wildasin, Interjurisdictional capital mobility: Fiscal externality and a corrective subsidy, Journal of Urban Economics 25 (1989) 193-212.
36. D.E. Wildasin, Externalities and bailouts: hard and soft budget constraints in intergovernmental fiscal relations, Working paper No. 1843, World Bank, Washington, 1997.
37. G.R. Zodrow, P. Mieszkowski, Pigou, Tiebout, property taxation, and the underprovision of local public goods, Journal of Urban Economics 19 (1986) 356-370.