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Volumn 38, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 125-135

Revealing information in auctions: The allocation effect

Author keywords

Auctions; Bundling; Information revelation

Indexed keywords


EID: 54249163533     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: 14320479     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-006-0177-4     Document Type: Conference Paper
Times cited : (62)

References (17)
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  • 3
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    • Auctions versus negotiations
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    • Bulow, J.1    Klemeperer, P.2
  • 4
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    • Bundling decision for selling multiple objects
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    • Chakraborty, I.1
  • 5
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    • On a possible benefit to bid takers from using multi-stage auctions
    • R. Engelbrecht-Wiggans 1988 On a possible benefit to bid takers from using multi-stage auctions Manage Sci 34 1109 1120
    • (1988) Manage Sci , vol.34 , pp. 1109-1120
    • Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R.1
  • 6
    • 54249113005 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Optimal information disclosure in auctions: The handicap auction
    • (forthcoming)
    • Eso, P., Szentes, B.: Optimal information disclosure in auctions: the handicap auction. Rev Econ Stud (forthcoming) (2006)
    • (2006) Rev Econ Stud
    • Eso, P.1    Szentes, B.2
  • 7
    • 8644290206 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Ignorance promotes competition: An auction model with endogenous private valuations
    • J.-J. Ganuza 2004 Ignorance promotes competition: an auction model with endogenous private valuations RAND J Econ 35 583 598
    • (2004) RAND J Econ , vol.35 , pp. 583-598
    • Ganuza, J.-J.1
  • 10
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    • Supplying information to facilitate price discrimination
    • T. Lewis D. Sappington 1994 Supplying information to facilitate price discrimination Int Econ Rev 35 309 327
    • (1994) Int Econ Rev , vol.35 , pp. 309-327
    • Lewis, T.1    Sappington, D.2
  • 11
    • 0001757115 scopus 로고
    • A theory of auctions and competitive bidding
    • P. Milgrom R. Weber 1982 A theory of auctions and competitive bidding Econometrica 50 1089 1122
    • (1982) Econometrica , vol.50 , pp. 1089-1122
    • Milgrom, P.1    Weber, R.2
  • 13
    • 0000961856 scopus 로고
    • Bundling decisions by a multiproduct monopolist with incomplete information
    • T. Palfrey 1983 Bundling decisions by a multiproduct monopolist with incomplete information Econometrica 51 463 484
    • (1983) Econometrica , vol.51 , pp. 463-484
    • Palfrey, T.1
  • 14
    • 0001228240 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • On the failure of the linkage principle in multi-unit auctions
    • M. Perry P. Reny 1999 On the failure of the linkage principle in multi-unit auctions Econometrica 67 895 900
    • (1999) Econometrica , vol.67 , pp. 895-900
    • Perry, M.1    Reny, P.2
  • 15
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    • Information acquisition in auctions
    • N. Persico 2000 Information acquisition in auctions Econometrica 68 135 148
    • (2000) Econometrica , vol.68 , pp. 135-148
    • Persico, N.1
  • 17
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    • Should auctioneers supply early information fo prospective bidders
    • (forthcoming)
    • Vagstad, S.: Should auctioneers supply early information fo prospective bidders. Int J Ind Organ (forthcoming) (2006)
    • (2006) Int J Ind Organ
    • Vagstad, S.1


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.