Three-sided stable matchings with cyclic preferences

Algorithmica (New York)

Volumn 58, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 5-18

  Biró, Péter ^a   McDermid, Eric ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Computational complexity; Cyclic preferences; Kidney exchange; Stable marriage problem; Three dimensional matching

Indexed keywords

EXCHANGE PROBLEMS; EXCHANGE PROGRAMS; KIDNEY EXCHANGE; MATCHINGS; NP COMPLETE; PREFERENCE LISTS; REAL APPLICATIONS; STABLE MARRIAGE PROBLEM; STABLE MATCHING; STABLE MATCHING PROBLEM; STRONG STABILITY; THREE DIMENSIONAL MATCHING; THREE DIMENSIONS;

DECISION THEORY; FARM BUILDINGS; STABILITY CRITERIA; THREE DIMENSIONAL;

COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY;

EID: 77953612837     PISSN: 01784617     EISSN: 14320541     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00453-009-9315-2     Document Type: Article

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