Worsening schisms in Thai domestic politics

Japanese Journal of Political Science

Volumn 11, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 125-147

  Ganesan, N ^a  

^a Hiroshima Peace Institute   (Japan)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77953580291     PISSN: 14681099     EISSN: 14740060     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S1468109909990168     Document Type: Article

References (77)

1. The 'political culture' approach to the study of developing countries was in vogue in the 1960s. Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba are generally regarded as pioneers of the approach in the United States. The approach emphasized participatory norms and attitudes among citizens that in turn reflected the political system and interacted with it. However, by the 1970s, the literature in the field began to regard the cultural approach as both amorphous as well as reductionist and unscientific, emphasizing behavioural norms rather than scientific data that could be verified and disproved more readily. Nonetheless, the approach continues to offer poignant glimpses into cultures and peoples and may be regarded as part of what anthropologists like Clifford Geertz regard as 'thick description'. For the seminal work on political culture see Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963).
2. Anek Laothamatas, Business Associations and the new Political Economy of Thailand: From Bureaucratic Polity to Liberal Corporatism (Boulder, CO:Westview Press, 1992).
3. For an interesting article on the linkage between Prem and the monarchy see Duncan McCargo, 'Thaksin and the Resurgence of Violence in the Thai south: Network Monarchy Strikes Back?', Critical Asian Studies, 38 (1) (2006): 39-71.
4. Also see his most recent piece on the situation in Thailand in 'Thai Politics as Reality TV', Journal of Asian Studies, 68 (1) (February 2009): 7-19.
5. For amuchmore systematic appraisal of the monarchy's involvement in and management of the political process see Paul Handley, The King Never Smiles: A Biography of Thailand's Bhumibol Adulyadej (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006).
6. Interestingly, although Thaksin polled well for his popularity at the outset, by his second term, this popularity that derived fromhis populist policies in the rural areas had begun to wane. In fact,many of those polled were prepared for the return of a strongman rather than the continuation of democracy. For a feel of the pulse of the nation at the time of the coup and after see Satoru Mikami and Takashi Inoguchi, 'Legitimacy and Effectiveness in Thailand, 2003-2007: Perceived Quality of Governance', International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 8 (2008): 279-302.
7. See Clark D. Neher, 'Semi-Successful Semi-Democracy', Asian Survey, 38 (2) (1988): 192-201.
8. It should be noted however that there is considerable disagreement in the scholarly community whether semidemocracy constitutes a regime type. See William F. Case, 'Can the Halfway House Stand? Semi- Democracy and Elite Theory in Three Southeast Asian Countries', Comparative Politics, 28 (4) (1996): 437-465
9. and David Collier and Steven Levitsky, 'Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research', World Politics, 49 (3) (1997): 430-451.
10. See Katharya Um, 'Thailand and the Dynamics of Economic and Security Complex in Mainland Southeast Asia', Contemporary Southeast Asia, 13 (3) (1991): 245-270.
11. A Security Complex refers to a web of interactions between geographically proximate states that are relatively self-contained. Perceptions of external threat derive from such patterned interactions. The Indochina Security Complex groups the countries of mainland Southeast Asia into such a complex with Vietnam being the regional hegemon. See Barry Buzan, 'The Southeast Asian Security Complex', Contemporary Southeast Asia, 10 (1) (1988): 1-16
12. and Muthiah Alagappa, 'TheDynamics of International Security in Southeast Asia: Change and Continuity', Australian Journal of International Affairs, 45 (1) (1991): 17-21.
13. See Surin Maisrikrod, Thailand's Two General Elections: Democracy Sustained (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1992).
14. See Suchit Bunbongkarn, 'Thailand's Successful Reforms', Journal of Democracy, 10 (4) (1999): 54-68
15. and N. Ganesan, 'Appraising Democratic Developments in Post-Authoritarian States: Thailand and Indonesia' Asian Affairs: An American Review, 28 (1) (2001): 3-18.
16. Paul Handley argues that the sufficiency economy was mooted only after the monarchy attempted to deflect the tremendous loss of prestige to itself and money to the Crown Property Bureau, whose holdings in Siam Commercial Bank and Siam Cement Company in particular were subjected to significant degradation and subsequent insolvency. Handley argues that the monarchy attempted to avoid the IMF reforms and replace the Chaovalit government with a 'national government' modeled along that of Prem in the 1980s. However, this attempt was thwarted before the rebuke of capitalism and invocation of the sufficiency economy. See Handley, The King Never Smiles, pp. 407-417.
17. Michael Montesano, 'Thailand in 2001: Learning to Live with Thaksin', Asian Survey, 42 (1) (2002): 90-99.
18. See James Ockey, 'Change and Continuity in the Thai Political Party System', Asian Survey, 43 (4) (2003): 663-680.
19. In the final tally, Thai Rak Thai secured 377 seats, the Democrat Party obtained 96 seats, Chart Thai 25 seats, and the new Mahachon Party gained only two votes in the 500-member parliament. In order to move a motion of censure, the opposition needs the support of 25% of parliament or 125 MPs out of a total of 500.
20. 'Opposition takes battle to the EC: two more seats needed to launch censure bid', Bangkok Post, 11 February 2005;
21. 'Civic groups plan government rally to keep campaign in check', Bangkok Post, ibid., 9 March 2005
22. and 'Wider charter changes opposed', Bangkok Post, ibid., 30 May 2005.
23. See N. Ganesan, 'Appraising Democratic Consolidation in Thailand under Thaksin's Thai Rak Thai Government', Japanese Journal of Political Science, 7 (2) (2006): 153-174.
24. The Rak Paendin Thai and Thamma Thippathai were dissolved for having failed to file a report of their activities in 2005, while the Palang Dharma Party was dissolved for having failed to provide receipts of the spending of its subsidy to the Election Commission. See 'Three small parties dissolved', Nation, 22 October 2007.
25. See John Girling, Thailand: Society and Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981), pp. 157-158.
26. John Girling, Thailand: Society and Politics, Ibid., p. 160.
27. Ibid., pp. 160-161.
28. I owe this observation to a discussant memo from Michael Montesano while presenting a paper on political parties in Thailand in July 2006 in Singapore.
29. Banyat Bantadtan who led the Democrat Party in the 2005 election did not have the same level of support as Chuan Leekpai. His resignation immediately after the election results were announced left the party in limbo before Abhisit Vejjajiva was elected to lead the party. At 44 years of age, Abhisit is generally regarded as young and inexperienced. See 'Banyat, Sanan call it quits', Bangkok Post, 8 February 2005
30. and 'Abhisit steps in as acting party leader', Nation, 21 February 2005.
31. 'Thai Talk: The weaker the opposition, the more defiant the factions', Nation, 24 March 2005;
32. 'Another TRT faction sets up panel to spy on ministers', Bangkok Post, 25 March 2005;
33. 'Factional spat: Thaksin shrugs off Snoh's new politics centre', Nation, 31 March 2005;
34. 'Factional anger boils as Thaksin refuses to go to Sanoh's birthday bash', Bangkok Post, 31 March 2005;
35. 'TRT feud reaches new heights', Nation, 1 April 2005;
36. 'Factions go after Sudarat in tit-for-tat', Bangkok Post, 1 April 2005';
37. 'Tot TRT position: faction to "rock" party if Suriya is dumped', Nation, 13 April 2005;
38. 'Split over Auditor General: TRT rocked by rebellion', Nation, 26 May 2005;
39. 'Thaksin's bad day in parliament: expel me, Snoh dares PM', Nation, ibid., 9 June 2005
40. and 'Sanoh in open rebellion', Bangkok Post, 9 June 2005. Previously, Somsak Thepsuthin headed theWang Nam Yomfaction with 100 MPs, Snoh Tienthong headed theWang Nam Yen faction with about 40MPs, Thaksin's sister YaowapaWongsawat headed theWang Bua Ban faction, and Sudarat Keyuraphan headed the faction comprising some 30 MPs from Bangkok.
41. 'Members of 42 state enterprise labour groupsmay strike' and 'Forming a united front', Nation, 7 March 2006
42. and 'Labour unions move against Thaksin', Bangkok Post, 7 March 2006.
43. See 'Jaruvan slams government graft practices', Bangkok Post, 14 March 2006. The term 'policy corruption' is now commonly used by academics and researchers to refer to Thaksin's development plans and priorities, in particular large infrastructure projects.
44. 'Eyebrows raised as Shin deal wins tax shelters, rule waivers', Nation, 25 January 2006.
45. On the importance of village leaders and elders, see Michael Moerman, 'A Thai Village Headman as a Synaptic Leader', The Journal of Asian Studies, 28 (3) (May 1969): 535-549.
46. 'October 22 poll proposal deemed illegitimate', Bangkok Post, 17 May 2006
47. and 'Election fiasco: last EC members told to quit', Nation, 17 May 2006;
48. 'Govt, EC confirm poll on Dec 23', Bangkok Post, 5 October 2007
49. and 'Cabinet approves Dec 23 election', Nation, 17 October 2007.
50. See 'Constitutional Tribunal disbands Thai Rak Thai', Nation, 31 May 2007 and
51. and 'Wednesday night massacre' and 'Tribunal acquits democrats of all charges' Bangkok Post, 31 May 2007.
52. 'HM backs Surayud government', Nation, 5 December 2006.
53. 'Old money strikes back like a blast from the past', Nation, 15 December 2006.
54. Prem associates in the NLA include Vice Admiral Pachun Thampratheep, General Panthep Phuwanartnurak, General Pairoj Panitsamai, General Oud Buangbon, Admiral Prajet Siridej, Admiral Prasert Boonsong, and General Preecha Rojsen. See 'New Parliament: NLA "doesn't represent" all of the people', Nation, 13 October 2006.
55. 'CNS makes its case for the coup', Nation, 22 November 2006.
56. 'TRT-linked governors transferred', Bangkok post, 1 November 2006
57. and 'CNS moves to tighten army's grip', Bangkok post, ibid., 2 March 2007.
58. 'Army chief tightens his grip: transfers to counter PPP's rise in popularity', Bangkok Post, 16 November 2007.
59. 'Ministry scraps one-million-cows project', Bangkok Post, 29 November 2006.
60. 'Interior ministry to educate rural people on how to vote', Nation, 29 November 2006.
61. The factional leaders behind Samak include Sudarat Keyuraphan, YaowapaWongsawad, and Thaksin's spokesperson Surapong Suebwonglee. See 'Samak set to head up TRT bloc', Nation, 1 August 2007.
62. 'See 'PPP boasts itwill capture 250 house seats', Nation, 30 October 2007;
63. 'PPP alleges soldiers intimidate its canvassers' Nation, ibid., 29 October 2007
64. and 'Top-secret plan to ruin PPP revealed', ibid., 26 October 2007.
65. See 'PPP Faces dissolution over videos of Thaksin', Nation, 10 December 2007.
66. 'Hard talk: Thaksin's "National Unity" plan bitterly ironic', Nation, 11 December 2007.
67. 'Chetta to lead Ruam Jai Thai Chart Pattana', Bangkok Post, 16 October 2007
68. and 'Ruam Jai thai Chat Pattana elect Chettha as leader', Nation, 16 October 2007.
69. 'Prachai eyeing Saprang to join Matchima', Bangkok Post, 16 October 2007.
70. 'Chavalit predicts political calm after polls', Bangkok Post, 15 November 2007.
71. 'Thailand's future: military will keep "pulling the strings"', Nation, 16 February 2007.
72. 'Thai politics beyond 2006 coup', Bangkok Post, 31 July 2007.
73. In 2001, when Thaksin sidelined KasemWatanachai and Palakorn Suwannarat, within hours, they were appointed by the King to the Privy Council. See ShawnW. Crispin, 'Thailand: all the King's men', Asia Times, 22 September 2006.
74. For an elaboration of condensation symbols, see Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1985).
75. See Allen Hicken, 'The Politics of Economic Reform in Thailand: Crisis and Compromise', Working Paper No. 638,William Davidson Institute, Ann Arbor, MI, 2004, pp. 11-17.
76. ShawnW. Crispin, 'The Thai military's democratic nightmare', Asia Times, 30 November 2007.
77. A recently published article draws the conclusion that the 1997 constitution that allowed for enhanced executive power was as much responsible for Thaksin's success as the Asian financial crisis. See Kitti Prasirtsuk, 'From Political Reform and Economic Crisis to Coup d'etat in Thailand: The Twists and Turns of the Political Economy, 1997 - 2006', Asian Survey, 47 (6) (November/December 2007): 872-893.