The geographic distribution of political preferences

Annual Review of Political Science

Volumn 13, Issue , 2010, Pages 321-340

  Rodden, Jonathan ^a  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Economic geography; Electoral bias; Electoral rules; Party platforms; Political geography

Indexed keywords

EID: 77952943057     PISSN: 10942939     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1146/annurev.polisci.12.031607.092945     Document Type: Article

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