Legislative district configurations and fiscal policy in American States

Public Choice

Volumn 125, Issue 3-4, 2005, Pages 385-407

  Bradbury, John Charles ^a   Crain, W Mark ^b,c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF THE SOUTH   (United States)

^b GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c LAFAYETTE COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 28444466931     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-005-3058-7     Document Type: Review

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