Public choice principles of redistricting

Public Choice

Volumn 129, Issue 3-4, 2006, Pages 381-398

  Gilligan, Thomas W ^a   Matsusaka, John G ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Median voter; Redistricting; Voting rights

Indexed keywords

EID: 33751089835     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-006-9062-8     Document Type: Article

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