Agency conflicts, controlling owner proximity, and firm value: An analysis of dual-class firms in the United States

Corporate Governance: An International Review

Volumn 18, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 124-135

  Hoi, Chun Keung ^a   Robin, Ashok ^a  

^a ROCHESTER INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

Agency Theory; Blockholder Ownership; Corporate Governance; Governance Environments; Shareholder Value

Indexed keywords

EID: 77952568211     PISSN: 09648410     EISSN: 14678683     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8683.2010.00783.x     Document Type: Article

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