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International Journal of Game Theory
Volumn 27, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 147-156
Perfect folk theorems. Does public randomization matter?
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EID: 0032222404     PISSN: 00207276     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/BF01243200     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (4)
References (12)
  • 1
    • 0000885153 scopus 로고
    • The folk theorem for repeated games: A NEU condition
    • Abreu D, Dutta PK, Smith L (1994) The folk theorem for repeated games: A NEU condition. Econometrica 62:939-948
    • (1994) Econometrica , vol.62 , pp. 939-948
    • Abreu, D.1    Dutta, P.K.2    Smith, L.3
  • 2
    • 0041780411 scopus 로고
    • Long term competition - A game theoretic analysis
    • Meggido N (ed.) Springer Verlag
    • Aumann R, Shapley L (1994) Long term competition - A game theoretic analysis. In: Meggido N (ed.) Essays on game theory, Springer Verlag, pp. 1-15
    • (1994) Essays on Game Theory , pp. 1-15
    • Aumann, R.1    Shapley, L.2
  • 3
  • 4
    • 0000028492 scopus 로고
    • The folk theorem in repeated games with discounting or with incomplete information
    • Fudenberg D, Maskin E (1986) The folk theorem in repeated games with discounting or with incomplete information. Econometrica 54:533-554
    • (1986) Econometrica , vol.54 , pp. 533-554
    • Fudenberg, D.1    Maskin, E.2
  • 5
    • 0000919418 scopus 로고
    • On dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games
    • Fudenberg D, Maskin E (1991) On dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games. Journal of Economic Theory 53:428-438
    • (1991) Journal of Economic Theory , vol.53 , pp. 428-438
    • Fudenberg, D.1    Maskin, E.2
  • 7
    • 34249755470 scopus 로고
    • The folk theorem for finitely repeated games with mixed strategies
    • Gossner O (1995) The folk theorem for finitely repeated games with mixed strategies. International Journal of Game Theory 24:95-107
    • (1995) International Journal of Game Theory , vol.24 , pp. 95-107
    • Gossner, O.1
  • 8
    • 0013552549 scopus 로고
    • Equilibrium in supergames
    • Meggido N (ed.) Springer Verlag
    • Rubinstein A (1994) Equilibrium in supergames. In: Meggido N (ed.) Essays on game theory, Springer Verlag pp. 17-28
    • (1994) Essays on Game Theory , pp. 17-28
    • Rubinstein, A.1
  • 10
    • 0000851354 scopus 로고
    • Necessary and sufficient conditions for the perfect finite horizon folk theorem
    • Smith L (1995) Necessary and sufficient conditions for the perfect finite horizon folk theorem. Econometrica 63:425-430
    • (1995) Econometrica , vol.63 , pp. 425-430
    • Smith, L.1
  • 11
    • 0022669114 scopus 로고
    • On repeated games with complete information
    • Sorin S (1986) On repeated games with complete information. Math. Oper. Res. 11:147-160
    • (1986) Math. Oper. Res. , vol.11 , pp. 147-160
    • Sorin, S.1
  • 12
    • 0000885152 scopus 로고
    • The 'folk theorem' for repeated games with complete information
    • Wen Q (1994) The 'folk theorem' for repeated games with complete information. Econometrica 62:949-954
    • (1994) Econometrica , vol.62 , pp. 949-954
    • Wen, Q.1

* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.