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Games and Economic Behavior
Volumn 61, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 27-49
Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient
Author keywords

Folk theorem; Perfect public equilibrium; Repeated games
Indexed keywords

EID: 34548385303     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2006.11.002     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (29)
References (16)
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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.