Local autonomy, tax morale, and the shadow economy

Public Choice

Volumn 144, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 293-321

  Torgler, Benno ^a   Schneider, Friedrich ^b   Schaltegger, Christoph A ^c  

^a QUEENSLAND UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY   (Australia)

^b JOHANNES KEPLER UNIVERSITY LINZ   (Austria)

^c UNIVERSITY OF ST GALLEN   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

Federalism; Local autonomy; Shadow economy; Tax compliance; Tax evasion; Tax morale

Indexed keywords

EID: 77952420431     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-009-9520-1     Document Type: Article

References (77)

1. Allingham, M. G., & Sandmo, A. (1972). Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis. Journal of Public Economics, 1, 323-338.
2. Alm, J. (1999). Tax compliance and administration. In W. B. Hildreth & J. A. Richardson (Eds.), Handbook on taxation (pp. 741-768). New York: Marcel Dekker.
3. Alm, J., & Torgler, B. (2006). Culture differences and tax morale in the United States and Europe. Journal of Economic Psychology, 27, 224-246.
4. Alm, J., Jackson, B. R., & McKee, M. (1993). Fiscal exchange, collective decision institutions, and tax compliance. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 22, 285-303.
5. Alm, J., Martinez-Vazquez, J., & Schneider, F. (2004). 'Sizing' the problem of the hard-to-tax. Paper presented at the "Hard to tax: an international perspective". In J. Alm, J. Martinez-Vazquez, & S. Wallace (Eds.), Taxing the hard-to-tax. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
6. Alm, J., McClelland, G. H., & Schulze, W. D. (1992). Why do people pay taxes? Journal of Public Economics, 48, 21-48.
7. Alm, J., McClelland, G. H., & Schulze, W. D. (1999). Changing the social norm of tax compliance by voting. KYKLOS, 48, 141-171.
8. Andreoni, J., Erard, B., & Feinstein, J. (1998). Tax compliance. Journal of Economic Literature, 36, 818-860.
9. Bahl, R. W. (1971). A regression approach to tax effort and tax ratio analysis. International Monetary Fund Staff Paper, 18, 570-612.
10. Bahl, R. (1999). Implementation rules for fiscal decentralization. Working paper, international studies program, school of policy studies. Atlanta: Georgia State University.
11. Besley, T., & Case, A. (1995). Incumbent behavior: vote-seeking, tax-setting, and yardstick competition. American Economic Review, 85, 25-45.
12. Blankart, C. B. (2002). Steuern als Preise. Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Volkswirtschaft und Statistik, 138, 19-38.
13. Chelliah, R. J. (1971). Trends in taxation in developing countries. International Monetary Fund Staff Papers, 18, 254-331.
14. Crane, S. E., & Nourzad, F. (1992). Analyzing income tax evasion using amnesty data with self-selection correction: the case of the Michigan tax amnesty program. In J. Slemrod (Ed.), Why people pay taxes. Tax compliance and enforcement (pp. 167-189). Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
15. Cummings, R. G., Martinez-Vazquez, J., McKee, M., & Torgler, B. (2009, forthcoming). Tax morale affects tax compliance: evidence from surveys and an artefactual field experiment. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization.
16. Dreher, A., & Schneider, F. (2006). Corruption and the shadow economy: an empirical analysis. CREMA Working Paper 2006-01. Basel: Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts.
17. Elffers, H., Weigel, R. H., & Hessing, D. (1987). The consequences of different strategies for measuring tax evasion behavior. Journal of Economic Psychology, 8, 311-337.
18. Erard, B., & Feinstein, J. S. (1994). The role of moral sentiments and audit perceptions in tax compliance. Public Finance, 49, 70-89.
19. Feinstein, J. (1991). An econometric analysis of income tax evasion and its detection. RAND Journal of Economics, 22, 15-35.
20. Feld, L. P., & Frey, B. S. (2002a). Trust breeds trust: how taxpayers are treated. Economics of Governance, 3, 87-99.
21. Feld, L. P., & Frey, B. S. (2002b). The tax authority and the taxpayer. An exploratory analysis. Paper presented the 2002 Annual Meeting of the European Public Choice Society Belgirate.
22. Feld, L. P., & Kirchgässner, G. (2001). The political economy of direct legislation: direct democracy and local decision-making. Economic Policy, 16, 331-367.
23. Feld, L. P., & Schnellenbach, J. (2004). Begünstigt fiskalischer Wettbewerb die Politikinnovation und diffusion? Theoretische Anmerkungen und erste Befunde aus Fallstudien. In C. A. Schaltegger & S. Schaltegger (Eds.), Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik. Festschrift für René L. Frey. Zürich: vdf.
24. Feld, L. P., & Tyran, J.-R. (2002). Tax evasion and voting: an experimental analysis. KYKLOS, 55, 197-222.
25. Frey, B. S. (1997). Not just for the money. An economic theory of personal motivation. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.
26. Frey, B. S. (1999). Economics as a science of human behaviour. Boston: Kluwer Academic.
27. Frey, B. S. (2001). Inspiring economics. Human motivation in political economy. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
28. Frey, B. S., & Eichenberger, R. (1999). The new democratic federalism for Europe. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
29. Frey, B. S., & Feld, L. P. (2002). Deterrence and morale in taxation: an empirical analysis. CESifo Working Paper No. 760, August 2002.
30. Frey, B. S., & Stutzer, A. (2000). Happiness, economy and institutions. Economic Journal, 110, 918-938.
31. Frey, B. S., & Stutzer, A. (2002). Happiness and economics. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
32. Friedman, E., Johnson, S., Kaufmann, D., & Zoido-Lobaton, P. (2000). Dodging the grabbing hand: the determinants of unofficial activities in 69 countries. Journal of Public Economics, 76, 459-493.
33. Graetz, M. J., & Wilde, L. L. (1985). The economics of tax compliance: facts and fantasy. National Tax Journal, 38, 355-363.
34. Grasmick, H. G., Bursik, R. J., & Cochran, J. K. (1991). Render unto Caesar what is Caesar's: religiosity and taxpayers' inclinations to cheat. Sociological Quarterly, 32, 251-266.
35. Hirschman, A. O. (1970). Exit, voice, and loyalty. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
36. ISSP (1998). Codebook, religion II, ZA study 3190. Köln: Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung.
37. Ladner, A. (1994). Finanzkompetenzen der Gemeinden-ein Überblick über die Praxis. In F. Eng, A. Glatthard, & B. H. Koenig (Eds.), Finanzföderalismus (pp. 64-85). Bern: Emissionszentrale der Schweizer Gemeinden.
38. Lewis, A. (1982). The psychology of taxation. Oxford: Martin Robertson.
39. Lokwwod, B. (2006). The political economy of fiscal federalism. In A. Thtisham & G. Brosio (Eds.), Handbook of fiscal federalism. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
40. Long, S., & Swingen, J. (1991). The conduct of tax-evasion experiments: validation, analytical methods, and experimental realism. In P. Webley, H. Robben, H. Elffers, & D. Hessing (Eds.), Tax evasion: an experimental approach (pp. 128-138). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
41. Moulton, B. R. (1990). An illustration of a pitfall in estimating the effects of aggregated variables on micro units. Review of Economics and Statistics, 72, 334-338.
42. Oates, W. E. (1999). An essay on fiscal federalism. Journal of Economic Literature, 37, 1120-1149.
43. Oates, W. E. (1972). Fiscal federalism. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
44. Oates, W. E. (2008). On the evolution of fiscal federalism: theory and institutions. National Tax Journal, 61, 313-334.
45. Pommerehne, W. W., & Weck-Hannemann, H. (1996). Tax rates, tax administration and income tax evasion in Switzerland. Public Choice, 88, 161-170.
46. Pommerehne, W. W., Hart, A., & Frey, B. S. (1994). Tax morale, tax evasion and the choice of policy instruments in different political systems. Public Finance, 49(Suppl.), 52-69.
47. Rose-Ackerman, S. (1980). Risk taking and reelection: does federalism promote innovation? Journal of Legal Studies, 9, 593-616.
48. Roth, J. A., Scholz, J. T., & Witte, A. D. (1989). Taxpayer compliance, Vols. 1 and 2. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
49. Schaltegger, C. A., & Frey, R. L. (2003). Finanzausgleich und Föderalismus: Zur Neugestaltung der föderalen Finanzbeziehungen am Beispiel der Schweiz. Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, 4, 239-258.
50. Schmölders, G. (1951/1952). Finanzpsychologie. FinanzArchiv, 13, 1-36.
51. Schmölders, G. (1960). Das Irrationale in der öffentlichen Finanzwissenschaft. Hamburg: Rowolt.
52. Schmölders, G. (1962). Volkswirtschaftslehre und Psychologie. Berlin: Reinbek.
53. Schmölders, G. (1970). Survey research in public finance: a behavioral approach to fiscal theory. Public Finance, 25, 300-306.
54. Schneider, F. (2005a). Shadow economies around the world: what do we really know? European Journal of Political Economy, 21, 598-642.
55. Schneider, F. (2005b). Shadow economies of 145 countries all over the world: what do we really know?CREMA Working Paper 2006-01. Basel: Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts.
56. Schneider, F., & Enste, D. (2000). Shadow economies: size, causes, and consequences. Journal of Economic Literature, 38, 77-114.
57. Schneider, F., & Enste, D. H. (2002). The shadow economy. An international survey. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
58. Schneider, F., Torgler, B., & Schaltegger, Ch. (2008). Schattenwirtschaft und Steuermoral, Kompaktwissen. Zurich: Ruegger.
59. Schwartz, R., & Orleans, S. (1967). On legal sanctions. University of Chicago Law Review, 34, 282-300.
60. Smith, K. W. (1992). Reciprocity and fairness: positive incentives for tax compliance. In J. Slemrod (Ed.), Why people pay taxes. Tax compliance and enforcement (pp. 223-258). Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
61. Smith, K. W., & Stalans, L. J. (1991). Encouraging tax compliance with positive incentives: a conceptual framework and research directions. Law and Society Review, 13, 35-53.
62. Stutzer, A. (1999). Demokratieindizes für die Kantone der Schweiz. Working Paper No. 23. Zurich: University of Zurich, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics.
63. Tittle, C. (1980). Sanctions and social deviance: the question of deterrence. New York: Praeger.
64. Torgler, B. (2001). What do we know about tax morale and tax compliance? International Review of Economics and Business (RISEC), 48, 395-419.
65. Torgler, B. (2002). Speaking to theorists and searching for facts: tax morale and tax compliance in experiments. Journal of Economic Surveys, 16, 657-684.
66. Torgler, B. (2005). Tax morale and direct democracy. European Journal of Political Economy, 21, 525-531.
67. Torgler, B. (2006). The importance of faith: tax morale and religiosity. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 61, 81-109.
68. Torgler, B. (2007). Tax compliance and tax morale: a theoretical and empirical analysis. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
69. Torgler, B., & Schaltegger, C. A. (2005). Tax amnesties and political participation. Public Finance Review, 33, 403-431.
70. Torgler, B., & Schneider, F. (2007a). What shapes attitudes toward paying taxes? Evidence from multicultural European countries. Social Science Quarterly, 88, 443-470.
71. Torgler, B., & Schneider, F. (2007b). Shadow economy, tax morale, governance and institutional quality: a panel analysis. IZA Discussion Papers 2563, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
72. Torgler, B., Schaltegger, C. A., & Schaffner, M. (2003). Is forgiveness divine? A cross-culture comparison of tax amnesties. Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics, 139, 375-396.
73. Tyler, T. R. (1990a). Justice, self-interest, and the legitimacy of legal and political authority. In J. J. Mansbridge (Ed.), Beyond self-interest (pp. 171-179). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
74. Tyler, T. R. (1990b). Why people obey the law. New Haven: Yale University Press.
75. Tyler, T. R. (1997). Procedural fairness and compliance with the law. Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics, 133, 219-240.
76. Tyler, T. R., Casper, J. D., & Fisher, B. (1989). Maintaining allegiance toward political authorities: the role of prior attitudes and the use of fair procedures. American Journal of Political Science, 33, 629-652.
77. Young, M., Reksulak, M., & Shughart, W. F. (2001). The political economy of the IRS. Economics and Politics, 13, 201-220.