Tax compliance and administration

Handbook on Taxation

Volumn , Issue , 2019, Pages 741-768

  Alm, James ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85087732099     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4324/9781315093161-30     Document Type: Chapter

References (146)

1. Allers, M. (1994). Administrative and Compliance Costs of Taxation and Public Transfers in the Netherlands, Woltersgroep Groningen, Groningen, the Netherlands.
2. Allingham, M. G. and Sandmo, A. (1972). Income tax evasion: A theoretical analysis, Journal of Public Economies, 1. 323-338.
3. Alm, J. (1988a). Compliance costs and the tax avoidance-tax evasion decision, Public Finance Quarterly, 16-. 31-66.
4. Alm, J. (1988b). Uncertain tax policies, individual behavior, and welfare, The American Economic Review, 78: 237-245.
5. Alm, J., Bahl, R., and Murray, M. N. (1990). Tax structure and tax compliance, The Review of Economics and Statistics, 72: 603-613-
6. Alm, J., Bahl, R., and Murray, M. N. (1993). Audit selection and income tax underreporting in the tax compliance game, Journal of Development Economics, 42: 1-33.
7. Alm, J. and Beck, W. (1993). Tax amnesties and compliance in the long run: A time series analysis, National Tax Journal, 46: 53-60.
8. Alm, J., Cronshaw, M. B., and McKee, M. (1993). Tax compliance with endogenous audit selection rules, Kyklos, 46: 27—45.
9. Alm, J., Erard, B., and Feinstein, J. S. (1996). The relationship between state and federal tax audits, Empirical Foundations of Household Taxation (M. Feldstein andj. M. Poterba, eds.), University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp. 235-273.
10. Alm, J., Jackson, B. R., and McKee, M. (1992a). Deterrence and beyond: Toward a kinder, gentler IRS, Why People Pay Taxes (J.. Slemrod, ed.), University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, pp. 311-329.
11. Alm, J., Jackson, B. R., and McKee, M. (1992b). Estimating the determinants of taxpayer compliance with experimental data, National Tax Journal, 45: 107-114.
12. Alm, J., Jackson, B. R., and McKee, M. (1992c). Institutional uncertainty and taxpayer compliance, The American Economic Review, 82: 1018-1026.
13. Alm, J., Jackson, B. R., and McKee, M. (1993). Fiscal exchange, collective decision institutions, and tax compliance, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 22: 285-303.
14. Alm, J., McClelland, G. H., and Schulze, W. D. (1992). Why do people pay taxes? Journal of Public Economics, 48: 21-38.
15. Alm, J., McClelland, G. H., and Schulze, W. D. (1997). Changing the social norm of tax compliance by voting, working paper, Department of Economics, University of Colorado at Boulder.
16. Alm, J., McKee, M., and Beck, W. (1990). Amazing grace: Tax amnesties and tax compliance, National Tax Journal, 43: 23-37.
17. Alm, J., Sanchez, I., and dejuan, A. (1995). Economic and noneconomic factors in tax compliance, Kyklos, 48. 3-18.
18. Andreoni, J. (1991). On the desirability of a permanent tax amnesty, Journal of Public Economics, 45: 143-159.
19. Andreoni, J., Erard, B., and Feinstein, J. (1996). Tax compliance, working paper, Department of Economics, University of Wisconsin-Madison.
20. Axelrod, R. (1984). The Evolution of Cooperation, Basic Books, New York.
21. Bagchi, A., Bird, R., and Das-Gupta, A. (1995). An economic approach to tax administration reform, discussion paper no. 3, International Centre for Tax Studies, University of Toronto.
22. Bagnoli, M. and McKee, M. (1991). Voluntary contribution games: Efficient private provision of public goods, Economic Inquiry, 29: 351-366.
23. Baldry, J. C. (1987). Income tax evasion and the tax schedule: Some experimental results, Public Finance/Finances Publiques, 42: 357-383-
24. Beck, P. J., Davis, J. S., and Jung, W. (1991). Experimental evidence on taxpayer reporting behavior, The Accounting Review, 66: 535-558.
25. Beck, P. J. and Jung, W. (1989a). An economic model of taxpayer compliance under uncertainty, Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 8: 1-27.
26. Beck, P. J. and Jung, W. (1989b). Taxpayers' reporting decisions and auditing under information asymmetry, The Accounting Review, 66: 468-487.
27. Becker, G. S. (1968). Crime and punishment—An economic approach, The Journal of Political Economy, 76: 169-217.
28. Becker, W., Buchner, H., and Sleeking, S. (1987). The impact of public transfer expenditures on tax evasion: An experimental approach, Journal of Public Economics, 34: 243-252.
29. Beron, K., Tauchen, H. V., and Witte, A. D. (1992). The effect of audits and socioeconomic variables on compliance, Why People Pay Taxes (J. Slemrod, ed.), University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, pp. 67-89.
30. Bird, R. M. (1989). The administrative dimension of tax reform in developing countries, Tax Reform in Developing Countries (M. Gillis, ed.), Duke University Press, Durham, North Carolina, pp. 315-346.
31. Bird, R. M. and Casangera de Jantscher, M., eds. (1992). Improving Tax Administration in Developing Countries, International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C.
32. Border, K. and Sobel, J. (1987). Samurai accountant: A theory of audit and plunder, The Review of Economic Studies, 54: 525-540.
33. Clotfelter, C. T. (1983). Tax evasion and tax rates: An analysis of individual returns, The Review of Economics and Statistics, 65: 363-373.
34. Collins, J. H. and Plumlee, R. D. (1991). The taxpayer’s labor and reporting decisions: The effect of audit schemes, The Accounting Review, 66: 559-576.
35. Cowell, F. A. (1981). Taxation and labour supply with risky activities, Economica, 48: 365-379.
36. Cowell, F. A. (1990). Cheating the Government: The Economics of Tax Evasion, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
37. Cowell, F. A. and Gordon, J. P. F. (1988). Unwillingness to pay: Tax evasion and public good provision, Journal of Public Economics, 36: 305-321.
38. Crane, S. E. and Nourzad, F. (1992). Analyzing income tax evasion using amnesty data with selfselection correction: The case of the Michigan tax amnesty program, Why People Pay Taxes (J. Slemrod, ed.), University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, pp. 167-189.
39. Crane, S. E. and Nourzad, F. (1994). An empirical analysis of factors that distinguish those who evade on their tax return from those who choose not to file a return, Public Finance/Finances Publiques, 49 (supplement): 106-116.
40. Cremer, H. and Gahvari, F. (1995). Tax evasion and the optimal general income tax, Journal of Public Economics, 60: 235-249.
41. Cremer, H., Marchand, M., and Pestieau, P. (1990). Evading, auditing, and taxing: The equity-compliance tradeoff, Journal of Public Economics, 43: 67-92.
42. Cronshaw, M. B. and Aim, J. (1995). Tax compliance with two-sided uncertainty, Public Finance Quarterly, 23: 139-166.
43. Cross, R. B. and Shaw, G. K. (1982). On the economics of tax aversion, Public Finance/Finances Publiques, 37: 36-47.
44. Davis, D. D. and Holt, C. A. (1993). Experimental Economics, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey.
45. de Juan, A., Lasheras, M. J., and Mayo, R. (1994). Voluntary compliance and behavior of Spanish taxpayers, Public Finance/Finances Publiques, 49 (supplement): 90-105.
46. Dubin, J. A., Graetz, M. J., and Wilde, L. L. (1990a). The effect of audit rates on the federal individual income tax, 1977-1986, National Tax Journal, 43: 395-409.
47. Dubin, J. A., Graetz, M. J., and Wilde, L. L. (1990b). The changing face of tax enforcement, 1978-1988, Tax lawyer, 43: 893-913.
48. Dubin, J. A., Graetz, M. J., Udell, M. A., and Wilde, L. L. (1992). The demand for tax preparation services, The Review of Economics and Statistics, 74: 75-82.
49. Dubin, J. A. and Wilde, L. L. (1988). An empirical analysis of federal income tax auditing and compliance, National Tax Journal, 41: 61-74.
50. Elffers, H. (1991). Income Tax Evasion: Theory and Measurement, Rotterdam, the Netherlands, Kluwer, Deventer.
51. Elffers, H., Weigel, R. H., and Hessing, D. J. (1987). The consequences of different strategies of measuring tax evasion behavior, Journal of Economic Psychology, 8: 311-337.
52. Elster, J. (1989). Social norms and economic theory, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 3: 99117.
53. Erard, B. (1992). The influence of tax audits on reporting behavior, Why People Pay Taxes (J. Slemrod, ed.), University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, pp. 95-114.
54. Erard, B. (1993). Taxation with representation: An analysis of the role of tax practitioners in tax compliance, Journal of Public Economics, 52: 163-197.
55. Erard, B. (1997). Self-selection with measurement errors: A microeconometric analysis of the decision to seek tax assistance and its implications for tax compliance, Journal of Econometrics, 81: 319-356.
56. Erard, B. and Feinstein, J. S. (1994a). Honesty and evasion in the tax compliance game, RAND Journal of Economics, 25: 1-19.
57. Erard, B. and Feinstein, J. S. (1994b). The role of moral sentiments and audit perceptions in tax compliance, Public Finance/Finances Publiques, 49 (supplement): 70-89.
58. Erard, B. and Feinstein, J. S. (1996). Reporting behavior and audit selection decision, working paper, Yale School of Management, New Haven, Connecticut.
59. Erard, B. and Ho, C.-C. (1995). Searching for ghosts: Who are the nonfilers and how much tax do they owe? working paper, Department of Economics, Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada.
60. Falkinger, J. and Walther, H. (1991). Rewards versus penalties: On a new policy against tax evasion, Public Finance Quarterly, 19: 67-79.
61. Feige, E. L. (1989). The Underground Economies: Tax Evasion and Information Distortion, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, England.
62. Feinstein, J. S. (1990). Detection controlled estimation, Journal of Law and Economics, 33: 233-276.
63. Feinstein, J. S. (1991). An econometric analysis of income tax evasion and its detection, RAND Journal of Economics, 22: 14-35.
64. Fisher, R. C., Goddeeris, J. H., and Young, J. C. (1989). Participation in tax amnesties: The individual income tax, National Tax Journal, 42: 15-27.
65. Friedland, N. (1982). A note on tax evasion as a function of the quality of information about the credibility of threatened fines: Some preliminary research Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 12: 54-59.
66. Friedland, N., Maital, S., and Rutenberg, A. (1978). A simulation study of income tax evasion, Journal of Public Economics, 10: 107-116.
67. Friedman, D. (1991). Evolutionary games in economics, Econometrica, 59: 637-666.
68. Goode, R. (1981). Some economic aspects of tax administration, IMF Staff Papers, 28: 249-274.
69. Gordon, J. P. F. (1989). Individual morality and reputation costs as deterrents to tax evasion, European Economic Review, 33: 797-805.
70. Gould, S. J. (1996). Full House, Harmony Books, New York.
71. Graetz, M. J. and Wilde, L. L. (1985). The economics of tax compliance: Fact and fantasy, National Tax Journal, 38: 355-363.
72. Graetz, M. J., Reinganum, J. F., and Wilde, L. L. (1986). The tax compliance game: Toward an interactive theory of tax enforcement, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2:1-32.
73. Greene, P. A. (1997). Corporate Tax Compliance and IRS Audit Strategy, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Colorado at Boulder.
74. Greenberg, J. (1984). Avoiding tax avoidance: A (repeated) game-theoretic approach, Journal of Economic Theory, 32: 1-13.
75. Harris and Associates, Inc. (1988). 1987 Taxpayer Opinion Survey, Conducted for the U.S. Internal Revenue Service, Internal Revenue Service Document 7292, Washington, D.C.
76. Herschel, F. J. (1978). Tax evasion and its measurement in developing countries, Public Finance/Finances Publiques, 33: 232-268.
77. Hunter, W. J. and Nelson, M. A. (1996). An IRS production function, National Tax Journal, 49: 105-115.
78. Internal Revenue Service (1978). A Dictionary of Compliance Factors, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Washington, D.C.
79. Internal Revenue Service (1988). Income Tax Compliance Research: Gross Tax Gap Estimates and Projections for 1973-1992, publication 7285, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Washington, D.C.
80. Internal Revenue Service (1990). Income Tax Compliance Research: Net Tax Gap and Remittance Gap Estimates (Supplement to Publication 7285), publication 1415, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Washington, D.C.
81. Internal Revenue Service (1995). Internal Revenue Service 1993-94 Data Book, publication 55B, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.
82. Internal Revenue Service (1996). Federal Tax Compliance Research: Individual Income Tax Gap
83. Estimates for 1985, 1988, and 1992, publication 1415, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Washington, D.C.
84. Joulfaian, D. and Rider, M. (1996). Tax evasion in the presence of negative income tax rates, National Tax Journal, 49: 553-570.
85. Kahneman, D. and Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk, Econometrica, 47: 263-291.
86. Kaplow, L. (1990). Optimal taxation with costly enforcement and evasion, Journal of Public Economics, 43: 221-236.
87. Kesselman, J. (1989). Income tax evasion: An intersectoral analysis, Journal of Public Economics, 38: 137-182.
88. Kinsey, K. A. (1992). Deterrence and alienation effects of IRS enforcement: An analysis of survey data, Why People Pay Taxes(J.- Slemrod, ed.), University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, pp. 259-285.
89. Klepper, S. and Nagin, D. (1989a). The anatomy of tax evasion, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 5, 1-24.
90. Klepper, S. and Nagin, D. (1989b). The role of tax practitioners in tax compliance, Policy Sciences, 22: 167-192.
91. Klepper, S., Mazur, M., and Nagin, D. (1991). Expert intermediaries and legal compliance: The case of tax preparers, Journal of Law and Economics, 34: 205-229.
92. Landsberger, M. and Meilijson, I. (1982). Incentive generating state dependent penalty system, Journal of Public Economics, 19: 333-352.
93. Lewis, A. (1979). An empirical assessment of tax mentality, Public Finance/Finances Ptibliques, 43: 245-257.
94. Long, J. E. and Caudill, S. B. (1987). The usage and benefits of paid tax return preparation, National Tax Journal, 40: 35-46.
95. Long, S. B. and Swingen, J. A. (1991). Taxpayer compliance: Setting new agendas for research, Law and Society Review, 25: 637-683.
96. Machina, M. J. (1987). Choice under uncertainty: Problems solved and unsolved, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1: 121-154.
97. Malik, A. and Schwab, R. (1991). The economics of tax amnesties, Journal of Public Economics, 46: 29-49.
98. Manasan, R. G. (1988). Tax evasion in the Philippines, 1981-1985, Journal of Philippine Development, 15: 167-189.
99. Martinez-Vazquez, J., Harwood, G. B., and Larkins, E. R. (1992). Withholding position and income tax compliance: Some experimental evidence, Public Finance Quarterly, 20: 152-174.
100. Martinez-Vazquez, J. and Rider, M. (1995). Multiple modes of tax evasion: Theory and evidence from the TCMP, working paper, Department of Economics, Georgia State University, Atlanta.
101. Mikesell, J. L. (1986). Amnesties for state tax evaders: The nature of and response to recent programs, National Tax Journal, 39: 507-525.
102. Mookherjee, D. and Png, I. (1989). Optimal auditing, insurance, and redistribution, QuarterlyJournal of Economics, 104: 399-415.
103. Murray, M. N. (1995). Sales tax compliance and audit selection, National Tax Journal, 48: 515-530.
104. Myles, G. D. and Naylor, R. A. (1996). A model of tax evasion with group conformity and social customs, European Journal of Political Economy, 12: 49-66.
105. Pencavel, J. H. (1979). A note on income tax evasion, labor supply, and nonlinear tax schedules, Journal of Public Economics, 12: 115-124.
106. Pestieau, P. and Possen, U. M. (1991). Tax evasion and occupational choice, Journal of Public Economics, 45: 107-125.
107. Plott, C. R. (1987). Dimensions of parallelism: Some policy applications of experimental methods, Laboratory Experimentation in Economics: Six Points of View (A. E. Roth, ed.), Cambridge University Press, New York, pp. 193-219.
108. Polinsky, A. M. and Shavell, S. (1984). The optimal use of fines and punishment, Journal of Public Economics, 24: 89-99.
109. Pommerehne, W. W., Hart, A., and Frey, B. S. (1994). Tax morale, tax evasion, and the choice of tax policy instruments in different political systems, Public Finance/Finances Publiques, 49 (supplement): 52-69.
110. Pommerehne, W. W. and Weck-Hannemann, H. (1989). Tax rates, tax administration and income tax evasion in Switzerland, discussion paper no. B8904, Department of Economics, University of Saarland, Saarbrücken.
111. Quiggin J. (1993). Generalized Expected Utility Theory-. The Rank-Dependent Model, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston.
112. Reinganum, J. F. and Wilde, L. L (1985). Income tax compliance in a principal-agent framework, Journal of Public Economics, 26-, 1-18.
113. Reinganum, J. F. and Wilde, L. L. (1986). Equilibrium verification and reporting policies in a model of tax compliance, International Economic Review, 27: 739-760.
114. Reinganum, J. F. and Wilde, L L. (1991). Equilibrium enforcement and compliance in the presence of tax practitioners, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 7: 163-181.
115. Rice, E. M. (1992). The corporate tax gap: Evidence on tax compliance by small corporations, Why People Pay Taxes (J. Slemrod, ed.), University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, pp. 125-161.
116. Rickard, J. A., Russell, A. M., and Howroyd, T. D. (1982). A tax evasion model with allowance for retroactive penalties, Economic Record, 58: 379-385.
117. Roth, A. E., ed. (1987). Laboratory Experimentation in Economics-. Six Points of View, Cambridge University Press, New York.
118. Roth, J. A., Scholz, J. T., and Witte, A. D., eds. (1989). Taxpayer Compliance, Volume 1: An Agenda for Research and Volume 2: Social Science Perspectives, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia.
119. Sanchez, I. and Sobel, J. (1993). Hierarchical design and enforcement of income tax policies, Journal of Public Economics, 50: 345-369.
120. Sandford, C., ed. (1995). Tax Compliance Costs-. Measurement and Policy, Fiscal Publications, Bath, United Kingdom.
121. Sandmo, A. (1981). Income tax evasion, labor supply, and the equity-efficiency tradeoff, Journal of Public Economics, 16: 265-288.
122. Scholz, J. K. (1994). The earned income tax credit: Participation, compliance, and antipoverty effectiveness, National Tax Journal, 47: 59-81.
123. Scotchmer, S. (1989). The effects of tax advisors on tax compliance, Taxpayer Compliance, Volume 2: Social Science Perspectives, University of Pennsylvania, Press, Philadelphia.
124. Scotchmer, S. and Slemrod, J. (1989). Randomness in tax enforcement, Journal of Public Economics, 38-, 17-32.
125. Sheffrin, S. M. and Triest, R. K. (1992). Can brute deterrence backfire? Perceptions and attitudes in taxpayer compliance, Why People Pay Taxes (J. Slemrod, ed.), University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, pp. 193-218.
126. Slemrod, J. (1985). An empirical test for tax evasion, The Review of Economics and Statistics, 67: 232-238.
127. Slemrod, J., ed. (1992). Why People Pay Taxes, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor.
128. Slemrod, J. and Yitzhaki, Y. (1987). The optimal size of a tax collection agency, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 89: 183-192.
129. Smith, K. W. and Kinsey, K. A. (1987). Understanding taxpayer behavior: A conceptual framework with implications for research, Law and Society Review, 21: 639-663.
130. Smith, V. L (1976). Experimental economics: Induced value theory, The American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 66: 214-279.
131. Smith, V. L. (1982). Microeconomic systems as an experimental science, The American Economic Review, 72: 923-955.
132. Spicer, M. W. and Becker, L. A. (1980). Fiscal inequity and tax compliance: An experimental approach, National Tax Journal, 33: 171-175.
133. Spicer, M. W. and Hero, R. E. (1985). Tax evasion and heuristics: A research note, Journal of Public Economics, 26: 263-267.
134. Spicer, M. W. and Thomas, J. E. (1982). Audit probabilities and the tax evasion decision: An experimental approach, Journal of Economic Psychology, 2: 242-245.
135. Srinivasan, T. N. (1973). Tax evasion: A model, Journal of Public Economics, 2: 339-346.
136. Stigler, G. J. (1970). The optimum enforcement of laws. The Journal of Political Economy, 78: 526-536.
137. United States General Accounting Office (1976). How the Internal Revenue Service Selects Individual Income Tax Returns for Audit, Report to the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, Congress of the United States, Washington, D.C.
138. Usher, D. (1986). Tax evasion and the marginal cost of public funds, Economic Inquiry, 24: 563-586.
139. Vogel, J. (1974). Taxation and public opinion in Sweden: An interpretation of recent survey data, National Tax Journal, 27: 499-513.
140. Webley, P. (1987). Audit Probabilities and tax evasion in a business simulation, Economics Letters, 25: 267-270.
141. Webley, P., Robben, H., Elffers, H., and Hessing, D. (1991). Tax Evasion: An Experimental Approach, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, England.
142. Westat, Inc. (1980). Individual Income Tax Compliance Factors Study Qualitative Research Results, Prepared for the Internal Revenue Service, February 4, 1980, by Westat, Inc., Rockville, Maryland.
143. Witte, A. D. and Woodbury, D. F. (1985). The effect of tax laws and tax administration on tax compliance, National Tax Journal, 38: 1-13.
144. Yankelovich, Skelly, and White, Inc. (1984). Taxpayer Attitudes Survey: Final Report. Public Opinion Survey Prepared for the Public Affairs Division, Internal Revenue Service, December 1984, by Yankelovich, Skelly, and White, Inc., New York.
145. Yaniv, G. (1988). Withholding and non-withheld tax evasion, Journal of Public Economics, 35: 183-204.
146. Yitzhaki, S. (1974). A note on “Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis,” Journal of Public Economics, 3: 201-202.