International environmental regimes: Legalisation, flexibility and effectiveness

Australian Journal of Political Science

Volumn 45, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 245-260

  Böhmelt, Tobias ^a   Pilster, Ulrich H ^b  

^a ETH ZURICH   (Switzerland)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ESSEX   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77952389089     PISSN: 10361146     EISSN: 17429536     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/10361141003736158     Document Type: Article

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