The enforcement problem in coercive bargaining: Interstate conflict over rebel support in civil wars

International Organization

Volumn 64, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 281-312

  Schultz, Kenneth A ^a  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77952383841     PISSN: 00208183     EISSN: 15315088     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0020818310000032     Document Type: Article

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