Evolutionary dynamics

NATO Science for Peace and Security Series B: Physics and Biophysics

Volumn , Issue , 2008, Pages 11-44

  Hauert, Christoph ^a,b  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA   (Canada)

Author keywords

Continuous games; Evolutionary branching; Evolutionary game theory; Evolutionary graph theory; Prisoner's dilemma; Snowdrift game; Social dilemmas; Structured populations

Indexed keywords

EID: 77949465665     PISSN: 18746500     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4020-8761-5-3     Document Type: Article

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