Losing the lead: The patenting decision in the light of the disclosure requirement

Economics of Innovation and New Technology

Volumn 19, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 147-164

  Zaby, Alexandra K ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TÜBINGEN   (Germany)

Author keywords

Disclosure requirement; Patent height; Patenting decision; Secrecy; Vertical product differentiation

Indexed keywords

EID: 77649085199     PISSN: 10438599     EISSN: 14768364     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/10438590802492836     Document Type: Article

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