Breaking the law when others do: A model of law enforcement with neighborhood externalities

European Economic Review

Volumn 54, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 163-180

  Ferrer, Rosa ^a  

^a DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS   (Spain)

Author keywords

Externalities; Law enforcement; Multiple equilibria; Neighborhood effects; Risk dominance

Indexed keywords

CRIME; EXPENDITURE; LAW ENFORCEMENT; NEIGHBORHOOD; PROBABILITY;

EID: 77549084964     PISSN: 00142921     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2009.04.008     Document Type: Article

References (34)

1. Akerlof G., and Yellen J. Gang behavior, law enforcement and community values. In: Aaron H.J., Mann T.E., and Taylor T. (Eds). Values and Public Policy (1994), Brookings Institution Press, Washington, DC 1994
2. Angeletos G.M., Hellwig C., and Pavan A. Signaling in a global game: Coordination and policy traps. Journal of Political Economy 114 (2006) 452-484
3. Bar-Gill O., and Harel A. Crime rates and expected sanctions: The economics of deterrence revisited. Journal of Legal Studies 30 (2001) 485-501
4. Becker G.S. Crime and punishment: An economic approach. Journal of Political Economy 76 (1968) 169-217
5. Block M., and Sidak J.G. The cost of antitrust deterrence: Why not hang a price fixer now and then?. Georgetown Law Journal 68 (1980) 1131-1139
6. Brogden M., and Nijhar P. Community Policing: National and International Models and Approaches (2005), Willan Publishing
7. Calvó-Armengol A., and Zenou Y. Social networks and crime decisions: The role of social structure in facilitating delinquent behavior. International Economic Review 45 (2004) 939-958
8. Carlsson H., and van Damme E. Global games and equilibrium selection. Econometrica 61 (1993) 989-1018
9. Department of Transportation and the Office of Justice Programs, 2003. The use of electronic citations: a nationwide assessment. Available at: 〈www.it.ojp.gov/documents/20030619_BJA_Study_of_Electronic_Citations.pdf〉.
10. Ehrlich I. Participation in illegitimate activities: A theoretical and empirical investigation. Journal of Political Economy 81 (1973) 521-565
11. Ehrlich I. Crime, punishment and the market for offenses. Journal of Economic Perspectives 10 (1996) 43-67
12. Ferrer, R., 2008. Breaking the law when others do: A model of law enforcement with neighborhood externalities. Working paper available at: 〈http://ssrn.com/abstract=1402470〉.
13. Freeman S., Grogger J., and Sonstelie J. The spatial concentration of crime. Journal of Urban Economics 40 (1996) 216-231
14. Glaeser E.L., Sacerdote B., and Scheinkman J.A. Crime and social interactions. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 111 (1996) 507-548
15. Harsanyi J.C., and Selten R. A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games (1988), The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
16. Huck S., and Kosfeld M. The dynamics of neighbourhood watch and norm enforcement. Economic Journal 117 (2007) 270-286
17. International Association of Chiefs of Police-Highway Safety Committee, 2003. Traffic Safety Strategies for Law Enforcement: A Planning Guide for Law Enforcement Executives, Administrators and Managers. Available at: www.nhtsa.dot.gov/people/injury/enforce/TrafficSafety.pdf.
18. Levitt S.D. Why do increased arrest rates appear to reduce crime? Deterrence, incapacitation, or measurement error. Economic Inquiry 36 (1998) 353-372
19. Malik A.S. Avoidance, screening and optimum enforcement. Rand Journal of Economics 21 (1990) 341-353
20. Mookherjee D. Marginal deterrence in enforcement of law. Journal of Political Economy 102 (1994) 1039-1066
21. Myerson R.B. Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict (1991), Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA
22. Polinsky M., and Shavell S. The optimal tradeoff between the probability and magnitude of fines. American Economic Review 69 (1979) 880-891
23. Rasmusen E. Stigma and self-fulfilling expectations of criminality. Journal of Law and Economics 39 (1996) 519-544
24. Sah R.K. Social osmosis and patterns of crime. Journal of Political Economy 99 (1991) 1272-1295
25. Sampson R.J. Neighbourhood and community. Collective Efficacy and Community Safety. New Economy 11 (2004) 106-113
26. Sampson R.J., Morenoff J.D., and Gannon-rowley T. Neighborhood effects: Social processes and new directions in research. Annual Review of Sociology 28 (2002) 443-478
27. Schrag J., and Scotchmer S. The self-reinforcing nature of crime. International Review of Law and Economics 17 (1997) 325-335
28. Schmidt D., Shupp R., Walker J.M., and Ostrom E. Playing safe in coordination games: the roles of risk dominance, payoff dominance and history of play. Games and Economic Behavior 42 (2003) 281-299
29. Silverman D. Street crime and street culture. International Economic Review 45 (2004) 761-786
30. Spier K.E. Settlement with multiple plaintiffs: The role of insolvency. Journal of Law and Economics 18 (2002) 295-323
31. Stigler G.J. The optimum enforcement of laws. Journal of Political Economy 78 (1970) 526-536
32. Straub P.G. Risk dominance and coordination failures in static games. The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance 35 (1995) 339-363
33. Van Huyck J.B.V., Battalio R.C., and Beil R.O. Tacit coordination games, strategic uncertainty, and coordination failure. American Economic Review 80 (1990) 234-248
34. Young P.H. The evolution of conventions. Econometrica 61 (1993) 57-84