A unified analysis of rational voting with private values and group-specific costs

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 70, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 457-471

  Taylor, Curtis R ^a   Yildirim, Huseyin ^a  

^a DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Coordination problem; Costly voting; Free riding incentive; Underdog effect

Indexed keywords

EID: 77249155688     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2010.02.008     Document Type: Article

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