Non-bayesian learning

B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics

Volumn 10, Issue 1, 2010, Pages

  Epstein, Larry G ^a   Noor, Jawwad ^a   Sandroni, Alvaro ^b  

^a BOSTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Non Bayesian learning

Indexed keywords

EID: 77249136043     PISSN: None     EISSN: 19351704     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1623     Document Type: Article

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