Ad exchanges: Research issues

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 5929 LNCS, Issue , 2009, Pages 1-12

  Muthukrishnan, S ^a  

^a GOOGLE INC   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

RESEARCH DIRECTIONS; RESEARCH ISSUES; TWO-SIDED MARKETS;

ABSTRACTING; WINE;

INTERNET;

EID: 76649133825     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-10841-9_1     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (24)

1. RightMedia, http://www.rightmedia.com/ More info at, http://www. rightmedia.com/right-media-101/
2. AdECN. http://www.adecn.com/. Whitepaper at, http://www.adecn.com/ resources/-A-True-Exchange-for-Online-Advertising.pdf. Presentation at, http://www.adecn.com/resources/AdECNPresentation.pps
3. DoubleClick Ad Exchange, http://www.doubleclick.com/products/ advertisingexchange/index.aspx
4. O'Hara, M.: Market Microstructure Theory. Blackwell, Oxford (1995)
5. Madhavan, A.: Market Microstructure: A Survey. Journal of Financial Markets 3(3), 205-258 (2000)
6. Muthukrishnan, S.: Internet Ad Auctions: Insights and Directions. In: Aceto, L., Damgård, I., Goldberg, L.A., Halldórsson, M.M., Ingólfsdóttir, A., Walukiewicz, I. (eds.) ICALP 2008, Part I. LNCS, vol. 5125, pp. 14-23. Springer, Heidelberg (2008)
7. Klemperer, P.: Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature. J. of Economic Surveys, 227-286 (1999)
8. Varian, H.: Position Auctions. Intl. J. of Industrial Organization (2006)
9. Edelman, B., Ostrovsky, M., Schwarz, M.: Internet advertising and the generalized second price auction: Selling billions of dollars worth of keywords. American Economic Review 97(1), 242-259 (2007)
10. Vickrey, W.: Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders. Journal of Finance 16, 8-37 (1961)
11. Myerson, R.: Optimal auction design. Math of Operations Research 6, 58-73 (1981)
12. Feldman, J., Mirrokni, V., Muthukrishnan, S., Pai, M.: Charaterizing Equilibria of Auctions with Mediators (manuscript, 2009)
13. Ghosh, A., Rubinstein, B., Vassilvitskii, S., Zinkevich, M.: Adaptive bidding for display advertising. In: Proc. WWW (2009)
14. Lu, P., Teng, S., Yu, C.: Truthful Auctions with Optimal Profit. In: Spirakis, P.G., Mavronicolas, M., Kontogiannis, S.C. (eds.) WINE 2006. LNCS, vol. 4286, pp. 27-36. Springer, Heidelberg (2006)
15. Baliga, S., Vohra, R.: Market Research and Market Design (2003), http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/baliga/htm/mrandmd.pdf
16. Aggarwal, G., Goel, G., Mehta, A.: Efficiency of (revenue-)optimal mechanisms. In: ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC), pp. 235-242 (2009)
17. Mirrokni, V., Muthukrishnan, S., Nadav, U.: Quasi-Proportional Mechanisms: Prior-free Revenue Maximization. arXivs (2009), http://arxiv1. library.cornell.edu/pdf/0909.5365v1
18. Even Dar, E., Mansour, Y., Nadav, U.: Convergence in Proportional Games. In: Proc. STOC (2009)
19. Chakraborty, T., Even-Dar, E., Guha, S., Mansour, Y., Muthukrishnan, S.: Callout optimization (manuscript, 2009)
20. Parkes, D., Rabin, M., Shieber, S., Thorpe, C.: Practical secrecy-preserving, verifiably correct and trustworthy auctions. In: Proc. EC, pp. 70-81 (2006)
21. Ghosh, A., McAfee, P., Papineni, K., Vassilvitskii, S.: Bidding for Representative Allocations for Display Advertising. In: Leonardi, S. (ed.) WINE 2009. LNCS, vol. 5929, pp. 208-219. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)
22. Rabin, M., Muthukrishnan, S., Yung, M.: Fast, communication efficient, provably secure protocols for real-time Vickrey auctions (manuscript, 2009)
23. Muthukrishnan, S.: Bidding on Configurations in Internet Ad Auctions. In: Ngo, H.Q. (ed.) COCOON 2009. LNCS, vol. 5609, pp. 1-6. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)
24. Lahaie, S., Parkes, D., Pennock, D.: An Expressive Auction Design for Online Display Advertising. In: AAAI, pp. 108-113 (2008)