Repeated games with frequent signals

Quarterly Journal of Economics

Volumn 124, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 233-265

  Fudenberg, Drew ^a   Levine, David K ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 62949102775     PISSN: 00335533     EISSN: 15314650     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/qjec.2009.124.1.233     Document Type: Article

References (20)

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