Corporate governance and backdating of executive stock options

Contemporary Accounting Research

Volumn 26, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 403-445

  Collins, Daniel W ^a   Gong, Guojin ^b   Li, Haidan ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF IOWA   (United States)

^b PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c SANTA CLARA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Backdating; Corporate governance; Executive compensation; Stock option grants

Indexed keywords

EID: 76249134374     PISSN: 08239150     EISSN: 19113846     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1506/car.26.2.4     Document Type: Conference Paper

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