Portfolio performance and agency

Review of Financial Studies

Volumn 23, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 1-23

  Dybvig, Philip H ^a   Farnsworth, Heber K ^a   Carpenter, Jennifer N ^b  

^a WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 75449085121     PISSN: 08939454     EISSN: 14657368     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhp056     Document Type: Article

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