On the generalized principal-agent problem: Decomposition and existence results

Review of Economic Design

Volumn 5, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 23-58

  Faynzilberg, Peter S ^a   Kumar, Praveen ^b  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF HOUSTON   (United States)

Author keywords

Adverse selection; Existence; Generalized agency; Moral hazard; Separability

Indexed keywords

EID: 0042373524     PISSN: 14344742     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s100580050046     Document Type: Article

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