Sabotage in dynamic tournaments

Journal of Mathematical Economics

Volumn 46, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 179-190

  Gürtler, Oliver ^a   Münster, Johannes ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF COLOGNE   (Germany)

^b FREIE UNIVERSITÄT BERLIN   (Germany)

Author keywords

Contests; Dynamic tournaments; Heterogeneity; Sabotage

Indexed keywords

EID: 75249106884     PISSN: 03044068     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2009.11.003     Document Type: Article

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