CEO cash and stock-based compensation changes, layoff decisions, and shareholder value

Financial Review

Volumn 42, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 99-119

  Brookman, Jeffrey T ^a   Chang, Saeyoung ^a   Rennie, Craig G ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NEVADA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ARKANSAS   (United States)

Author keywords

CEO pay; Corporate governance; Corporate restructuring; Executive compensation; G34; J33; J63; Layoffs

Indexed keywords

EID: 73949103170     PISSN: 07328516     EISSN: 15406288     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6288.2007.00163.x     Document Type: Article

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