Optimal incentive contracts for loss-averse managers: Stock options versus restricted stock grants

Financial Review

Volumn 41, Issue 4, 2006, Pages 451-482

  Dodonova, Anna ^a   Khoroshilov, Yuri ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OTTAWA   (Canada)

Author keywords

Behavioral finance; Executive stock options; G39; Incentive compensation; Incentive contract; M52; Managerial risk aversion; Restricted stock

Indexed keywords

EID: 79959525209     PISSN: 07328516     EISSN: 15406288     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6288.2006.00153.x     Document Type: Article

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