Tax evasion and social interactions

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 91, Issue 11-12, 2007, Pages 2089-2112

  Fortin, Bernard ^a   Lacroix, Guy ^a   Villeval, Marie Claire ^b,c  

^a UNIVERSITÉ LAVAL   (Canada)

^b GATE Lyon Saint Etienne   (France)

^c IZA   (Germany)

Author keywords

Laboratory experiments; Simultaneous tobit; Social interactions; Tax evasion

Indexed keywords

EID: 35649014774     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.03.005     Document Type: Article

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