Income distribution and equilibrium multiplicity in a stigma-based model of tax evasion

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 87, Issue 7-8, 2003, Pages 1591-1616

  Kim, Youngse ^a  

^a Yonsei University   (South Korea)

Author keywords

Income distribution; Multiple equilibria; Stigma; Tax evasion; Tax reform

Indexed keywords

EID: 0041340922     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(01)00219-5     Document Type: Article

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