Why EMU is not a failure

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 26, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 1-11

  Grüner, Hans Peter ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MANNHEIM   (Germany)

^b CEPR   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Central bank credibility; Central bank flexibility; Common currency areas

Indexed keywords

EID: 72149097072     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2009.08.006     Document Type: Article

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