Competition as a coordination device: Experimental evidence from a minimum effort coordination game

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 24, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 437-454

  Riechmann, Thomas ^a   Weimann, Joachim ^a  

^a OTTO VON GUERICKE UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

Author keywords

Competition; Coordination failure; Minimum effort coordination; Team production

Indexed keywords

EID: 44149089375     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2007.09.004     Document Type: Article

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