Efficient sequential assignment with incomplete information

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 68, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 144-154

  Gershkov, Alex ^a   Moldovanu, Benny ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BONN   (Germany)

Author keywords

Dynamic mechanism design; Sequential assignment

Indexed keywords

EID: 72049106615     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2009.06.005     Document Type: Article

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