Imposing sanctions: States, firms, and economics coercion

International Studies Review

Volumn 5, Issue 4, 2003, Pages 65-79

  Morgan, T Clifton ^a   Bapat, Navin A ^a  

^a RICE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

FOREIGN POLICY; GAME THEORY; SANCTION; TRADE POLICY;

EID: 0347930413     PISSN: 15219488     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1079-1760.2003.00504007.x     Document Type: Article

References (26)

1. AL-SOWAYEL, DINA. (1999) Target Types and the Efficacy of Economic Sanctions. Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Rice University.
2. BINMORE, KEN. (1992) Fun and Games: A Text on Game Theory. Lexington: Basil Blackwell.
3. BOLKS, SEAN M., AND DINA AL-SOWAYEL. (2000) How Long Do Economic Sanctions Last? Examining the Sanctions Process through Duration. Political Research Quarterly 53:241-265.
4. BOYD, ALAN. (2002) Myanmar Sanctions in the Dock. Asia Times. June 18. Available at www.atimes.com/se-asia/DF18Ae01.html
5. DREZNER, DANIEL (1998) Conflict Expectations and the Paradox of Economic Coercion. International Studies Quarterly 42:709-731.
6. DREZNER, DANIEL. (1999) The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations. New York: Cambridge University Press.
7. DRURY, A. COOPER. (1998) Revisiting Economic Sanctions Reconsidered. Journal of Peace Research 35:497-509.
8. DRURY, A. COOPER. (2001) Sanctions as Coercive Diplomacy: The US President's Decision to Initiate Economic Sanctions. Political Research Quarterly 54:485-508.
9. HUFBAUER, GARY, J. J. SCHOTT, AND KIMBERLY ANN ELLIOT (1990) Economic Sanctions Reconsidered. Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics.
10. IRAN AND LIBYA SANCTIONS ACT OF 1996. US Public Law 104-172 [H.R. 3107].
11. KAEMPFER, W. AND A. LOWENBERG. (1998) Unilateral vs. Multilateral International Sanctions. A Public Choice Perspective. International Studies Quarterly 43:37-58.
12. LUCE, R. DUNCAN, AND HOWARD RAIFFA, (1957) Games and Decisions. New York: Wiley.
13. MARTIN, LISA. (1992) Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
14. MILLIGAN, SUSAN. (2002) House Votes to Lift Ban on Cuba Travel; White House Sought to Keep the Sanctions. Boston Globe, National/Foreign Section, July 24:A2.
15. MORGAN, T. CLIFTON, AND ANNE C. MIERS. (1999) When Threats Succeed: A Formal Model of the Threat and Use of Economic Sanctions. Unpublished Manuscript, Rice University.
16. MORGAN, T. CLIFTON, AND VALERIE L. SCHWEBACH. (1996) Economic Sanctions as Instruments of Foreign Policy: The Role of Domestic Politics. International Interactions 21:247-263.
17. MORGAN, T. CLIFTON, AND VALERIE L. SCHWEBACH. (1997) Fools Suffer Gladly: The Use of Economic Sanctions in International Crises. International Studies Quarterly 41:27-50.
18. MORROW, JAMES D. (1994) Game Theory for Political Scientists. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
19. ORDESHOOK, PETER C. (1986) Game Theory and Political Theory. New York: Cambridge University Press.
20. PAPE, ROBERT. (1997) Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work. International Security 22:90-136.
21. REDDY, ANITHA. (2002) Ikea, Tyson Foods among U.S. Embargo Violators. Washington Post, News Section, July 3:E01.
22. SALPUKAS, AGIS. (1997) Foreign Energy, Domestic Politics; Burmese Project Tests Unocal Resolve. New York Times, May 22:D1.
23. SMITH, ALASTAIR. (1996) The Success and Use of Economic Sanctions. International Interactions 21: 229-245.
24. THELEN, K. S., AND K. STEINMO. (1992) Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics. In Structuring Politics, edited by K. S. Thelen, K. Steinmo and F. Longstreth. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
25. TSEBELIS, GEORGE. (1990) Are Economic Sanctions Effective? A Game Theoretic Analysis. Journal of Conflict Resolution 34:3-28.
26. WAGNER, R. HARRISON. (1988) Economic Interdependence, Bargaining Power, and Political Influence. International Organization 42:461-482.