Cournot competition between teams: An experimental study

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 72, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 691-702

  Raab, Philippe ^a   Schipper, Burkhard C ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BONN   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Experiments; Group behavior; Theory of the firm; Unitary player assumption

Indexed keywords

EID: 70350393894     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2009.07.004     Document Type: Article

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