Repeated price competition between individuals and between teams

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 66, Issue 3-4, 2008, Pages 808-821

  Bornstein, Gary ^a   Kugler, Tamar ^b   Budescu, David V ^c   Selten, Reinhard ^d  

^a HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

^d UNIVERSITY OF BONN   (Germany)

Author keywords

Bertrand model; Experiments; Group behavior; Price competition; Tacit collusion

Indexed keywords

EID: 42649102678     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2006.06.004     Document Type: Article

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