Aging gracefully? Examining the conditions for sustaining successful collaboration in environmental law and governance

Environmental and Planning Law Journal

Volumn 26, Issue 6, 2009, Pages 457-485

  Holley, Cameron ^a  

^a AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY   (Australia)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION; ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING; GOVERNANCE APPROACH; POLICY MAKING; RESOURCE MANAGEMENT; SUSTAINABILITY; VOLUNTARY APPROACH;

AUSTRALASIA; AUSTRALIA;

EID: 70350364535     PISSN: 0813300X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (256)

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5. Gray B, Collaborating: Finding Common Ground for Multiparty Problems (Jossey-Bass, 1989) p 10
6. Heikkila T and Gerlak A, "The Formation of Large-Scale Collaborative Resource Management Institutions: Clarifying the Roles of Stakeholders, Science, and Institutions" (2005) 33(4) Policy Studies Journal 583 at 583
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9. Scott J and Holder J, "Law and New Environmental Governance in the European Union" in De Burca and Scott, n 2; Margerum, n 3 at 487.
10. Holley C and Gunningham N, "Environment Improvement Plans: Facilitative Regulation in Practice" (2006) 23 EPLJ 448.
11. Gunningham N, Holley C and Shearing C, "Neighbourhood Environment Improvement Plans: Community Empowerment, Voluntary Collaboration and Legislative Design" (2007) 24 EPLJ 125.
12. Head B, "Participation or Co-Governance? Challenges for Regional Natural Resource Management" in Eversole R and Martin J (eds), Participation and Governance in Regional Development (Ashgate, 2005).
13. See, eg European Union environmental assessment and framework directives (Scott and Holder, n 6); Project XL and "CALFED" initiatives in the United States (Freeman J, "Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State" (1997) 45 UCLA Law Review 1
14. Freeman J and Farber D, "Modular Environmental Regulation" (2005) 54 Duke Law Journal 795.
15. See Karkkainen B, "New Governance in Legal Thought and in the World: Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping" (2004) 89 Minnesota Law Review 471.
16. See, eg Walker, n 2, p 22; Karkkainen, n 11 at 473-474.
17. Margerum, n 4.
18. Karkkainen B, "Managing Transboundary Aquatic Ecosystems: Lessons from the Great Lakes" (2006) 19 Pacific McGeorge Global Business & Development Law Journal 209 at 212.
19. Moore S, "Regional Delivery of Natural Resource Management in Australia: Is it Democratic and Does it Matter?" in Eversole R and Martin J (eds), Participation and Governance in Regional Development (Ashgate, 2005).
20. Leach W, Pelkey N and Sabatier P, "Stakeholder Partnerships as Collaborative Policymaking: Evaluation Criteria Applied to Watershed Management in California and Washington" (2002) 21(4) Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 645.
21. Holley C, "Facilitating Monitoring, Subverting Self-Interest and Limiting Discretion: Learning From 'New' Forms of Accountability in Practice" (2010) 35(1) Columbia Journal of Environmental Law (forthcoming).
22. Koontz T and Thomas C, "What Do We Know and Need to Know about the Environmental Outcomes of Collaborative Management" (2006) December Public Administration Review 111 at 115.
23. For recent exceptions, see eg Bonnell J and Koontz T, "Stumbling Forward: The Organizational Challenges of Building and Sustaining Collaborative Watershed Management" (2007) 20 Society & Natural Resources 153
24. Lubell M, Sabatier P, Vedlitz A, Focht W, Trachtenberg Z and Matlock M, "Conclusions and Recommendations" in Sabatier P, Focht W, Lubell M, Trachtenberg Z, Vedlitz A and Matlock M (eds), Swimming Upstream (MIT, 2005) pp 285-289.
25. Some collaborative processes may be short term, designed to reach a "once-off" agreement: Head, n 3. Note also that not all authors see the survival of collaboration as a "good" thing: Taylor M, Public Policy in the Community (Palgrave, 2003) p 153.
26. Sabatier P, Focht W, Lubell M, Trachtenberg Z, Vedlitz A and Matlock M, "Collaborative Approaches to Watershed Management" in Sabatier et al, n 19.
27. Head B, "Governance" in Saunders P and Walter H (eds), Ideas and Influence (UNSW Press, 2005) p 57.
28. Menkel-Meadow C, "Getting to 'Let's Talk': Comments on Collaborative Environmental Dispute Resolution Processes" (2008)8 Nevada Law Journal 835 at 847; Bonnell and Koontz, n 19 at 153-154.
29. Of course forms of multiparty collaboration have a long history; however, when compared with dominant approaches that have historically characterised environmental governance (eg command and control), CEG stands as an identified emerging trend. De Burca G and Scott J, "Introduction: New Governance, Law and Constitutionalism" in De Burca and Scott, n 2, pp 1-2
30. Dovers S, "Processes and Institutions for Resource and Environmental Management: Why and How to Analyse?" in Dovers S and Wild River S (eds), Managing Australia's Environment (Federation Press, 2003) p 6
31. Koontz T, Steelman T, Carmin J, Korfmacher K, Moseley C and Thomas C, Collaborative Environmental Management (RFF, 2004) p 183.
32. Emerson K, "On Perfect Storms and Sacred Cows of Collaboration, Comments on Bradley Karkkainen, Getting to 'Let's Talk': Legal and Natural Destabilizations and the Future of Regional Collaboration" (2008) 8(3) Nevada Law Journal 830 at 833; Margerum, n 4 at 141; Bonnell and Koontz, n 19 at 154-155; Lubell et al, n 19, pp 294-295; Koontz et al, n 26, p 183.
33. Lubell et al, n 19, p 295.
34. Holley and Gunningham, n 7.
35. Sabatier P, Leach W, Lubell M and Pelkey N, "Theoretical Frameworks Explaining Partnership Success" in Sabatier et al, n 19.
36. Heikkila and Gerlak, n 4
37. John D, "Civic Environmentalism" in Durant R, Fiorino D and O'Leary R (eds), Environmental Governance Reconsidered (MIT, 2004) p 229; Sabatier et al, n 30, p 184.
38. Leach W and Sabatier P, "Are Trust and Social Capital the Keys to Success?" in Sabatier et al, n 19, p 234.
39. Common pool resources are natural or human-made resource systems that are sufficiently large as to make it costly (but not impossible) to exclude potential beneficiaries from obtaining benefits from their use. Typical examples are forests, or irrigation and fishery systems.
40. Schlager E, "Common Pool Resource Theory" in Durant R, Fiorino D and O'Leary R (eds), Environmental Governance Reconsidered (MIT, 2004) p 147.
41. Ostrom E, Governing the Commons (Cambridge Univerity Press, 1990).
42. Ostrom E, "The Danger of Self Evident Truths" (2000) 33(1) Political Science and Politics 33 at 39-40; Schlager, n 34, pp 154-162; Sabatier et al, n 30, p 184.
43. Reciprocally, government agencies or other typically powerful groups may continue to participate as they rely on the knowledge and assistance of non-governmental stakeholders. Lobel O, "The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought" (2004) 89 Minnesota Law Review 342 at 463-464.
44. Fung A and Wright E, "Thinking About Empowered Participatory Governance" in Fung A and Wright E (eds), Deepening Democracy (Verso, 2003) p 27.
45. Isaac T and Heller P, "Democracy and Development: Decentralized Planning in Karalla" in Fung and Wright, n 38, pp 93, 101
46. John, n 31, pp 239, 241-242; Lubell et al, n 19, p 288.
47. Transaction costs include the time, resources and travel expenses associated with collaborative processes. Lubell et al, n 19, p 288; Margerum, n 4 at 135, 137.
48. Fung and Wright, n 38, p 38
49. Steinzor R, "The Corruption of Civic Environmentalism" (2000) 30 ELR 10,909.
50. Fung A and Wright E, "Countervailing Power in Empowered Participatory Governance" in Fung and Wright, n 38, p 264.
51. Taylor M, Wilson M, Purdue D and Wilde P, Changing Neighbourhoods (Policy Press, 2007) p 76.
52. Sabatier et al, n 30, p 184; Fung and Wright, n 38, pp 32, 37-38.
53. Fung and Wright, n 38, p 38.
54. Margerum, n 4 at 141; John, n 31, p 239.
55. Dovers S, "Reflecting on Three Decades: A Synthesis" in Dovers and Wild River, n 26, p 519.
56. See generally, Beeson M and Firth A, "Neoliberalism as a Political Rationality: Australia Public Policy Since the 1980s" (1998)34(3) Journal of Sociology 215.
57. Bonnell and Koontz, n 19 at 163.
58. John D, "Good Cops, Bad Cops" (October/November 1999) Boston Review 19 at 19
59. Karkkainen B, "Information-Forcing Regulation and Environmental Governance" in De Burca and Scott, n 2, pp 293-321
60. Gunningham N and Sinclair D, Leaders and Laggards (Greenleaf, 2002) p 149.
61. Margerum, n 4 at 141.
62. Margerum, n 4 at 144-146; Bonnell and Koontz, n 19 at 161, 163.
63. Lane M, Critical Issues in Regional Natural Resource Management (paper prepared for the Australian State of the Environment Committee, Department of the Environment and Heritage, 2006) pp http://www.environment.gov.au/soe/2006/publications/integrative/nrm-issues/pubs/nrm-issues.pdf viewed 2 October 2009.
64. Margerum, n 4 at 144-146, 149; Freeman and Farber, n 10 at 900-901.
65. Ewing S, "Catchment Management Arrangements" in Dovers and Wild River, n 26, p 406
66. Farrelly M, "Regionalisation of Environmental Management: A Case Study of the Natural Heritage Trust, South Australia" (2005) 43(4) Geographical Research 393 at 400.
67. John, n 31, pp 239, 241-242.
68. Emerson, n 27 at 833; Bonnell and Koontz, n 19 at 165.
69. Koontz et al, n 26, p 183; Lubell et al, n 19, p 293.
70. Lubell et al, n 19, p 293.
71. Fung and Wright, n 38, p 38.
72. Lubell et al, n 19, p 295; Dovers, n 46, p 518.
73. See broad cost-benefit arguments in Sunstein C, "Consequences?" (October/November 1999) Boston Review 28 at 29.
74. Koontz et al, n 26, p 183; Fung and Wright, n 38, pp 27-29.
75. Bonnell and Koontz, n 19 at 154; Lubell et al, n 19, pp 294-295; Koontz et al, n 26, p 183.
76. Collective case studies involve jointly studying a number of cases in order to gain a better understanding, or better theorising, about a still larger collection of cases such as a phenomenon, population or general condition.
77. Stake R, "Case Studies" in Denzin N and Lincoln Y (eds), Strategies of Qualitative Inquiry (2nd ed, Sage, 2003) pp 136-138, 146
78. Yin R, Case Study Research Design and Methods (3rd ed, Sage, 2003) pp 53-54.
79. Patton M, Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods (2nd ed, Sage, 1990) pp 182-183
80. Conley A and Moote M, "Evaluating Collaborative Natural Resource Management" (2003) 16 Society & Natural Resources 371 at 378.
81. Program selection was also based in part on practical considerations (eg cases in eastern Australian States were selected to reduce travel costs). Note also that as RNRM is a national program implemented in partnership with the States, the choice of where to study RNRM carries with it a choice of a particular State's unique RNRM design features. The choice to examine RNRM in Queensland was made on the basis that its program offered a different policy context to the other two CEG experiments in Victoria, as well as a relatively unique "community" based approach to the RNRM program. Head, n 9, p 144.
82. These EIP sub cases were also selected to represent as close as practicably possible the seven different VEPA jurisdictional units that divide Victoria. Patton, n 64, pp 182-183.
83. The VEPA assisted purposes of this article it was excluded because it had only just begun implementation and thus did not contain sufficient data.
84. With unlimited time and funding it would have been beneficial to also contrast multiple RNRM sub cases. However, the research only explored one case study because, as explained below, RNRM is a far more complex program than the others.
85. These included residents/non-government groups, EPA, local government and industries in EIP; residents/non-government groups, EPA, local/State government and industries/businesses in NEIP; and regional/sub regional members and staff, farmers, federal/State/local governments, science, peak industry and conservation bodies in RNRM.
86. Neuman W, Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches (5th ed, Allyn and Bacon, 2003) pp 211, 214.
87. Some interviews were more informal and shorter in nature due to practical constraints. Furthermore, in accordance with the ethical and confidentiality responsibilities of the research, interviewee identity is protected by a system of number identifiers and a general stakeholder classification.
88. Fontana A and Frey J, "The Interview from Structured Questions to Negotiated Texts" in Denzin N and Lincoln Y (eds), Collecting and Interpreting Qualitative Materials (2nd ed, Sage, 2003) p 62.
89. Layder D, Sociological Practice Linking Theory and Social Research (Sage Publications, 1998)
90. Creswell J, Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among Five Traditions (Sage Thousand Oaks, 1998) pp 153-154.
91. Respondent validation involved holding a dialogue/reinterviewing five key government and/or non-government participants that had significant carriage and/or involvement in the programs (one in EIP, two NEIP and two RNRM).
92. Silverman D, Doing Qualitative Research A Practical Handbook (Sage, 2000) pp 99, 176
93. See Caring for our Country (Australian Government), http://www.nrm.gov.au viewed 2 October 2009.
94. See Caring for our Country, Caring for our Country Funding (Australian Government), http://www.nrm.gov.au/funding/index.html viewed 2 October 2009.
95. National Natural Resource Management Taskforce (NNRMTF), Managing Natural Resources in Australia for a Sustainable Future (Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry Australia, 1999) p 27
96. Whelan J and Oliver P, "Regional Community-Based Planning: The Challenge of Participatory Environmental Governance" (2005) 12 Australasian Journal of Environmental Management 126.
97. At the national level the overarching body of the program is the Natural Resource Management Ministerial Council (see http://www.mincos.gov.au/about_nrmmc viewed 2 October 2009). For other councils and boards, see Caring for our Country, Who Manages Natural Resource Management (NRM)? (Australian Government), http://www.nrm.gov.au/nrm/manage.html viewed 2 October 2009. Note that at the time of writing the Queensland and Commonwealth governments were negotiating new Bilateral Agreements (the previous agreements having been negotiated in 2001 for NAP and 2004 for NHT2) that will establish their joint responsibilities for delivering the recent Caring for Our Country program (see http://www.nrm.gov.au viewed 2 October 2009).
98. For a current list, see Caring for our Country, Policies, Agreements and Frameworks (Australian Government), http://www.nrm.gov.au/nrm/documents.html viewed 2 October 2009.
99. Margerum, n 4 at 143.
100. Ribot J, Democratic Decentralization of Natural Resources (World Resources Institute, 2002) p 4.
101. There are 56 regions in total across Australia.
102. Bilateral Agreement Between the Commonwealth of Australia and the State of Queensland to Deliver the Natural Heritage Trust, August 2004 (Cth, Qld) p 56, ss 67, 68(b), Attachment D; An Agreement Between the Commonwealth of Australia and the State of Queensland for the Implementation of the Intergovernmental Agreement on a National Action Plan for Salinity and Water Quality, March 2001 (Cth and Qld), s 7.1.
103. Other public and private stakeholders can also apply for government investment through the RNRM program. For an overview of the relatively recent Caring for Our Country program, see http://www.nrm.gov.au viewed 2 October 2009; Head, n 9.
104. Note also that in addition to 50-year regional targets, the Caring for Our Country program aspires to achieve outcomes in the context of 20-year projections of results in national priority areas: See Caring for Our Country, Caring for our Country Outcomes 2008-2013 (Australian Government), http://www.nrm.gov.au/publications/books/caring-outcomes.html viewed 2 October 2009; Bilateral Agreement Between the Commonwealth of Australia and the State of Queensland to Deliver the Natural Heritage Trust, August 2004 (Cth, Qld), pp 57, 72, Attachment H, s 11; NNRMTF, n 75, p 13.
105. See EPA Victoria website, http://www.epa.vic.gov.au viewed 2 October 2009; VEPA, Neighbourhood Environment Improvement Plans - Developing a Voluntary Proposal (Publication 846, VEPA, 2002) pp 6-8.
106. Victoria, Legislative Assembly, Debates, "Environment Protection (Liveable Neighbourhoods) Bill 2000 (Vic) 2nd Reading" (Hon S Garbutt, 2 November 2000) p 1,459.
107. VEPA, n 86, p 6.
108. Environment Protection Act 1970 (Vic), s 19AE.
109. Environment Protection Act 1970 (Vic), ss 19AH, 19AI.
110. Environment Protection Act 1970 (Vic), ss 19AI(3)(f), 19AJ, 19AI(e)(f).
111. Holley and Gunningham, n 7 at 448.
112. VEPA, Information Bulletin: Environment Improvement Plans (Publication 394, VEPA, 1993).
113. For an overview of the different types of EIPs, see Holley and Gunningham, n 7.
114. Total EIP numbers based on statistics obtained from VEPA: VEPA, Environment Improvement Plans - An Overview (Publication 938, VEPA, 2004).
115. "Good" performing industries generally maintained better performance records under their VEPA licence (eg infrequent licence violations). However, they often had pollution impacts that were problematic for local resident. Poor performing industries often had persistent regulatory breaches, had been fined (or even prosecuted), and were under close scrutiny by VEPA for their environmental impacts on either/both the local and wider environment. Gunningham and Sinclair, n 50, p 163.
116. The term industry is used in this article to refer to a single business or enterprise unless otherwise indicated. Furthermore, while it is beyond the scope of this article per se, it is important to note that in addition to collaboration, the EIP has been analysed as employing two further interrelated regulatory techniques, namely process based and informational regulation. For further information, see Holley and Gunnignham, n 7.
117. VEPA, Guidelines for Running Community Liaison Committees (Publication 740, VEPA, 2001) pp 1-3.
118. VEPA, Guidelines for the Preparation of Environment Improvement Plans (Publication 739, VEPA, 2002) p 1.
119. Cannon J, "Choices and Institutions in Watershed Management" (2000) 25 Wm & Mary Envtl L & Pol'y Rev 379 at 421-422.
120. Cannon, n 101 at 421-422.
121. The EIP is designed specifically to sustain the collaboration, noting that over time "[i]f participation is dropping off, it may be necessary to restart or reinitiate some of the contact strategies": VEPA, n 98, p 3
122. VEPA, n 99, p 11.
123. VEPA, Enforcement Policy (Publication 384.2, VEPA, 2005) p 9
124. Gunningham and Sinclair, n 50, p 57
125. VEPA, n 98, pp 4-5; VEPA, n 86, pp 4-6, 9; Australian and Queensland governments, Guidelines for Community Engagement by RNRM Bodies (2004) pp 2, 4-5; An Agreement Between the Commonwealth of Australia and the State of Queensland for the Implementation of the Intergovernmental Agreement on a National Action Plan for Salinity and Water Quality, March 2001 (Cth and Qld), s 12.5, Attachment 3, s 12; Bilateral Agreement Between the Commonwealth of Australia and the State of Queensland to Deliver the Natural Heritage Trust, August 2004 (Cth, Qld), s 83, Attachment E, pp 59-60, 62, 121
126. Nickelsburg S, "Mere Volunteers? The Promise and Limits of Community-Based Environmental Protection" (1998) 84 Virginia Law Review 1371.
127. VEPA, n 99, p 10; Environment Protection Act 1970 (Vic), s 19AI(3); Bilateral Agreement Between the Commonwealth of Australia and the State of Queensland to Deliver the Natural Heritage Trust, August 2004 (Cth, Qld), Attachment E, p 68.
128. Isaac and Heller, n 39, pp 93, 101; John, n 31, pp 239, 241-242; Lubell et al, n 19, p 288
129. Or the resolution of an environmental problem that impacts upon them.
130. Other benefits may include career advancement for government officers. John, n 31, pp 237-238; Sabatier et al, n 30, p 184.
131. VEPA, A Guideline for Submitting a Voluntary Neighbourhood Environment Improvement Plan Proposal (Publication 847, VEPA, 2002) pp 6-9.
132. Industry is required to make "contact with the community" as well as be responsible for the "circulation of agendas and minutes of the meeting[s]...providing refreshments and any other administrative support": VEPA, n 98, pp 5, 9.
133. VEPA, n 99, p 2.
134. Indeed, as the guidelines suggest, industry may also be motivated to support the collaboration because ongoing benefits from collaborating, including improved local community relationships, reduced liabilities and improved financial performance. Reputation benefits and less prescriptive regulatory requirements are also touted. These latter benefits arise where an EIP is undertaken as part of an "accredited licence" scheme: VEPA, n 99, p 1; Environment Protection Act 1970 (Vic), s 26B(2)(c).
135. This body must have responsibilities for the environment and be classified as a "protection agency" (eg local governments, or catchment management associations): Environment Protection Act 1970 (Vic), s 4(1); VEPA, n 86, p 7.
136. Note John emphasises an "outside sponsor" such as an official or agency manager, while NEIP views the sponsor as a partner and an organisation like a local government: John, n 31, p 239.
137. Interview 323, Government Agency; Burdekin Dry Tropics Natural Resource Management (BDTNRM), Regional Investment Strategy (BDTRNM, 2005) pp 8-9, 57.
138. Bilateral Agreement Between the Commonwealth of Australia and the State of Queensland to Deliver the Natural Heritage Trust, August 2004 (Cth, Qld), ss 71,117, 118, 119, Attachment A, p 40.
139. Depending on the arrangements developed by a given regional community, the body's relationships with these lower level implementers may take on a number of different forms. For example, some may be characterised by close collaboration between regional bodies and "sub regional" groups, while others may involve a service provider style of relationship where projects are sub-contracted out by the regional body to individuals. Other bodies may employ a mix of these or other strategies. Despite such variation, all these relationships are central to the success of RNRM in the long term and for the purposes of this discussion they are all considered to fall under RNRM's broad idea of "cooperative partnerships". Bilateral Agreement Between the Commonwealth of Australia and the State of Queensland to Deliver the Natural Heritage Trust, August 2004 (Cth, Qld), Attachment E, pp 62-63.
140. Sabatier et al, n 30, p 184.
141. VEPA, n 99, p 3.
142. Note that in the RNRM case the government has an ongoing commitment to ensure the regional body maintains its membership to an "appropriate" standard and the body remains designated: An Agreement Between the Commonwealth of Australia and the State of Queensland for the Implementation of the Intergovernmental Agreement on a National Action Plan for Salinity and Water Quality, March 2001 (Cth and Qld), ss 7.1(f) and(g); Bilateral Agreement Between the Commonwealth of Australia and the State of Queensland to Deliver the Natural Heritage Trust, August 2004 (Cth, Qld), ss 67, 68; Lubell et al, n 19, p 287; VEPA, n 99, pp 3, 6; VEPA, n 86
143. Head, n 9, p 148
144. Karkkainen B, "Collaborative Ecosystem Governance: Scale Complexity and Dynamism" (2001/2002) 21 Virginia Environmental Law Journal 189 at 240
145. Varughese G and Ostrom E, "The Contested Role of Heterogeneity in Collective Action: Some Evidence from Community Forestry in Nepal" (2001) 29(5) World Development 747 at 752.
146. In a few sub cases involving good performers, industry respondents pointed out that they also maintained their involvement in EIP because of the ongoing "reputation" benefit from having an EIP and/or the protection of their public and commercial profile achieved through ongoing engagement of otherwise aggrieved local communities: Interview 151, Industry; Interview 141, Industry; see also Gunningham and Sinclair, n 50, p 164.
147. Interview 181, EPA.
148. Interview 184, Industry.
149. Sabatier et al, n 30, p 184.
150. In all sub cases, the collaborations had remained open to interested new participants/wider community during these stages.
151. According to respondents, most actions had either been achieved or were on track to be achieved in the current plan. The actions included broad plant upgrades, staff training, operation changes, as well as monitoring studies to guide actions.
152. For further information, see Holley and Gunningham, n 7.
153. Interview 162, Local Resident.
154. Broadly speaking, local impacts of industry had been one of the strongest motivations for the initial involvement of local residents, who were typically "very irate" at industry's pollution impacts on their residences and lives: Interview 184, Industry.
155. Beyond local residents, other interests that participated in a minority of cases included political parties, community groups, and other collaborative government bodies, such as catchment management authoritie
156. "It has been in the last five years as we have dealt with many of the issues, the meetings have been held less and less frequently...If no one turns up we have made a commitment to hold them anyway": Interview 111, Industry.
157. Interview 123, EPA. Holley and Gunningham, n 7.
158. As one respondent put it, "The individuals have all got their own agenda": Interview 161, Industry.
159. Interview 112, Local Resident.
160. As a respondent from one of the oldest EIPs pointed out, "contacting the community is something I feel we've failed in...we still don't get people coming and joining up and we're all older, we're all old now": Interview 15/62, Local Resident.
161. Two respondents did note they had gained one new participant on their EIP committees; however, even then one of them ended up dropping off.
162. In rare situations when an industry committed a large localised pollution incident, local resident participation would certainly mushroom again, but it would quickly plummet as soon as the issue was resolved: Interview 162, Local Resident.
163. Ostrom, n 35, p 6.
164. Interview 162, Local Resident.
165. Lubell et al, n 19, p 295; Dovers, n 46, p 518.
166. NGOs were absent from four of the eight EIP sub cases and generally comprised less than 20% of the membership in the other four sub cases
167. While these issues had yet to be solved, the collaboration had nevertheless achieved sufficient success up to this point so as to encourage environmental groups to continue to collaborate to try and achieve more: Interview 132, EPA. Interview 131, Industry; Fung and Wright, n 42, p 264.
168. Shapiro S, "Administrative Law After the Counter-reformation: Restoring Faith in Pragmatic Government" (2000) 48 U Kan L Rev 689 at 729-730
169. A few respondents also suggested they continued to attend for more altruistic reasons. Without interviewing all local resident collaborators it is of course difficult to identify all benefits that they pursued.
170. As one respondent pointed out, "so for a large part the neighbourhood committee are made up of community representatives who used to be neighbours who now live [elsewhere]": Interview 161, Industry.
171. Interview 161, Industry.
172. Holley and Gunningham, n 7.
173. Interview 111, Industry. As a different respondent reflected, "There is not a lot more we can do to address noise issues"
174. Interview 161, Industry.
175. Interview 113, EPA. Holley and Gunningham, n 7.
176. Dovers, n 46, p 518; Shapiro S, "Administrative Law After the Counter-reformation: Restoring Faith in Pragmatic Government" (2000) 48 U Kan L Rev 689 at 729-730; Holley and Gunningham, n 7.
177. Of course much depends on individual circumstances. For example, in collaborations involving more recalcitrant or locally hazardous facilities, continuing resource input from VEPA may be more justified than in EIPs involving mature non-hazardous or good performing EIP enterprises. Holley and Gunningham, n 7.
178. Dovers, n 46, p 518.
179. Lubell et al, n 19, p 295; Fung and Wright, n 38, p 38.
180. Margerum, n 4 at 141; Fung and Wright, n 38, p 38.
181. Lubell et al, n 19, pp 286, 295; Holley and Gunningham, n 7.
182. Interview 215, Government Body; Interview 222, Government Body; Interview 234, Government Body.
183. Gunningham et al, n 8.
184. Another pointed out, "It's just the time that I can afford in my role and I'm responsible for...a very broad agenda [already] so there's not a lot of time I can put into it": Interview 213, Government Body.
185. Interview 222, Government Body.
186. Interview 226, Government Body.
187. As one respondent explained, the meetings that were held were generally informal, involving partners just talking about what they may or may not be doing, rather than more robust discussions and coordination on activities - "we had no resources...we were...able to talk about what we were doing...[but] It may not mean there's a great deal of progress in terms of the impact, a great deal of improvement in water quality in the catchment or access": Interview 215, Government Body.
188. "Since 2005 we've probably went into a bit of a lull in terms of momentum...The reason for that was that we didn't...have the resources to employ a staff person anymore, and basically we were waiting for opportunities for funding to employ someone": Interview 215, Government Body.
189. Interview 215, Government Body. "It fell into a bit of a hole...It seems to be dependent on what funds each group can
190. scrounge together, but they haven't really got around to doing that": Interview 218, Environmental Group.
191. Interview 223, Industry.
192. Interview 211, Local Resident. As two respondents noted, for example, "It would be difficult [to apply for funding]...[because] to prepare a decent submission kind of takes, you know a couple of weeks for it over a period of time anyway": Interview 215, Government Body; "the [collaborators] don't know when the new buckets of funding come along...I think it is unrealistic to think it will work like that": Interview 231, Government Body.
193. For example, government funding for addressing storm water related issues in NEIP 1 and external funding sources for "Cool Communities" program and a plastic bag free campaign in NEIP 2. Maribyrnong City Council and Stony Creek NEIP Partners, Stony Creek NEIP (Maribyrnong City Council, 2004) p 25 Surf Coast Shire Council and Anglesea NEIP Partners, Anglesea NEIP (Surf Coast Shire Council, 2004) p 23.
194. Interview 215, Government Body.
195. For example, funding for a project from which a small part of resources was used to support the group.
196. Interview 227, Local Resident.
197. Note that the plan is legally backed and, according to respondents, this ensured that no respondents had totally disengaged from the collaboration per se, as distinct from giving it a low priority. For further information on the NEIP's legal backing, see Gunningham et al, n 8.
198. Interview 228, Government Body.
199. This included industry, business and non-sponsor local government partners.
200. This appeared to be particularly the case with government stakeholders, as one respondent explained, "you lose [the paid coordinator/project officer] and it's suddenly all, gee, who do I contact? And I think I've seen a bit of a drop in enthusiasm of the [government project partners] to throw resources into it": Interview 222, Government Body.
201. Interview 225, EPA.
202. Interview 224, EPA.
203. Similar results have been found in earlier CEG initiatives such as Landcare: Curtis A, "The Landcare Experience" in Dovers and Wild River, n 26, p 453.
204. Margerum, n 4 at 149-150; Bonnell and Koontz, n 19, p 159; Freeman and Farber, n 10 at 870, 903; John, n 31, pp 239, 241.
205. Isaac and Heller, n 39, pp 93, 101; John, n 31, pp 239, 241-242; Lubell et al, n 19, p 288.
206. Interview 344, Regional Stakeholder; Burdekin Dry Tropics Natural Resource Management (BDTNRM), Business Plan 2007-2010 (prepared by Balfour consulting, 2007) p 5.
207. As One respondent who had experience working with different regional bodies commented that the subject case was less stable than others they had worked at before, noting significant "staff turn around" and "new positions put on the board": Interview 345, Regional Stakeholder. BDTNRM, n 195, p 3.
208. Interview 344, Regional Stakeholder; BDTNRM, n 195, p 5.
209. As one interview put it, "Attracting sufficient skills, [is difficult] having short term not very well paid positions": Interview 3210, Science. BDTNRM, n 195, p 20.
210. Paton et al, n 191 at 263.
211. BDTNRM, n 117, p 29-30.
212. Interview 361, Regional Group Collective. This finding was confirmed by a recent inquiry into the future of RNRM: Keogh K, Chant D and Frazer B, Review of Arrangements for Regional Delivery of Natural Resource Management Programmes (Ministerial Reference Group for Future NRM Programme Delivery, 2006) p 28.
213. Note that although CFOC reduces base level funding to regional bodies, they can obtain additional funding through CFOC's competitive grants process: Burdekin Dry Tropics Natural Resource Management, Annual Report 2007-2008 (BDTNRM, 2008) pp i-vi.
214. One respondent referred to a previously ongoing debate about agreeing to core funding arrangements under NHT 2 - "a big debate going on between us and Commonwealth, cause there is a view particularly in the central agencies that this model was foist on Queensland and as a result the Commonwealth should pay for the administrative cost, particularly the NHT groups"
215. Interview 323, Government Agency.
216. Interview 334, Regional Stakeholder; Department of Natural Resource Management (DNRM), Options for Future Community Engagement in Regional Natural Resource Management (DNRM, 2005) p 7. Note that "turf warfare" among administrative departments has undermined the sustainability of earlier collaborative NRM experiments in Australia: see Ewing, n 53, p 406.
217. Interview 311, Industry Body.
218. Interview 334, Regional Stakeholder.
219. Interview 337, Government Body.
220. Margerum, n 4 at 141; Lubell et al, n 19, p 294.
221. Margerum, n 4 at 141; John, n 31, p 239; Dovers, n 26, p 38.
222. Fung and Wright, n 38, p 38.
223. Margerum, n 4 at 141; John, n 31, p 239; Dovers, n 46, p 519.
224. Taylor, n 20, pp 153-154.
225. Head, n 9, p 145.
226. Margerum, n 4 at 149-150; Bonnell and Koontz, n 19 at 159.
227. Margerum, n 4 at 149-150; Bonnell and Koontz, n 19 at 159. Taylor et al, n 43, p 79.
228. Margeruxzm, n 4 at 141; John, n 31, p 239; Dovers, n 46, p 519; Fung and Wright, n 38, p 38. See also similar problems with earlier CEG initiatives: Ewing, n 53, pp 393, 405-406 Curtis, n 187, p 447
229. Ostrom, n 35; Lubell et al, n 19, p 288.
230. Sabatier et al, n 30, p 184.
231. Isaac and Heller, n 39; John, n 31, pp 239, 241-242; Lubell et al, n 19, p 288.
232. Lubell et al, n 19, p 288.
233. Head, n 9, p 145.
234. Fung and Wright, n 38, p 38.
235. Gunderson L, Holling C and Peterson G, "Surprises and Sustainability: Cycles of Renewal in the Everglades" in Gunderson H and Holling C (eds), Panarchy: Understanding Transformations in Human and Natural Systems (Island Press, 2001) p 327
236. Berkes F, "Alternatives to Conventional Management: Lessons from Small-Scale Fisheries" (2003) 31(1) Environments 5 at 9.
237. Note, however, that as we saw in NEIP a lack of progress resulted in some groups disengaging and becoming passive rather than active collaborators.
238. Karkkainen, n 123 at 242.
239. Karkkainen, n 123 at 242.
240. Karkkainen, n 123 at 242.
241. Karkkainen, n 123 at 242.
242. Bonnell and Koontz, n 19 at 158.
243. Bonnell and Koontz, n 19 at 165.
244. For further information, see Crawford A, The Local Governance of Crime (Clarendon Press, 1997) pp 165-168.
245. Steinzor R, "Reinventing Environmental Regulation: The Dangerous Journey from Command to Self-control" (1998) 22 Harvard Environmental Law Review 103.
246. Gunningham and Sinclair, n 50, p 149.
247. Selin S and Chavez D, "Developing a Collaborative Model for Environmental Planning and Management" (1995) 19(2) Environmental Management 189 at 191.
248. Such pressure may be used simply to compel the party to commence collaboration and then leave it to collaborative benefits to provide motivation for continued resource contribution (as was the case with good performers). Alternatively, for reluctant collaborators such as poorer performing industries, sustained pressure (direct or implied) may be vital: Freeman and Farber, n 10 at 870, 903.
249. Johnston L and Shearing C, Governing Security Explorations in Policing and Justice (Routledge, 2003) p 154.
250. John, n 31, pp 239, 241-242.
251. Margerum, n 4 at 144-146; Bonnell and Koontz, n 19 at 161, 163; Karkkainen, n 14 at 235-236.
252. Margerum, n 4.
253. Lubell et al, n 19, p 295; Dovers, n 46, p 518.
254. Raymond L, "Cooperation without Trust: Overcoming Collective Action Barriers to Endangered Species Protection" (2006) 34(1) The Policy Studies Journal 37 at 54.
255. For example, population shifts or changes in related government policy can impact on the sustainability of collaboration: Ostrom E, "Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms" (2000) 14(3) Journal of Economic Perspectives 137 at 153-154.
256. Fung and Wright, n 38, p 38. Sabatier et al, n 21, p 11.