Contracting in the shadow of the law

RAND Journal of Economics

Volumn 40, Issue 3, 2009, Pages 533-557

  Chakravarty, Surajeet ^a   MacLeod, W Bentley ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF EXETER   (United Kingdom)

^b Och Spine at New York Presbyterian Hospitals   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 70350139578     PISSN: 07416261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2009.00076.x     Document Type: Article

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