Adversarialism versus legalism: Juridification and litigation in corporate governance reform

Regulation and Governance

Volumn 3, Issue 3, 2009, Pages 235-258

  Cioffi, John W ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Adversarial legalism; Corporate governance reform; Litigation; Securities regulation

Indexed keywords

EID: 70350090659     PISSN: 17485983     EISSN: 17485991     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1748-5991.2009.01054.x     Document Type: Article

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